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Abstract 
 
Putnam’s seminal work on two-level game theory has been used widely in international 
negotiation research. The European Union is often argued to be a tough negotiating 
partner and its complex system of preferences poses a challenge to many of the 
fundamental assumptions of the two-level game model. The establishment of the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) in 2011 introduced another core stakeholder 
in EU negotiations which remains an under-researched area. This thesis proposes an 
alternative approach to the research of EU international negotiations based on the two-
level game model: the integration of practice theory. The recent ‘practice turn’ in social 
sciences provides a unique theoretical and methodological approach to the investigation 
of international phenomena. It is based on the premise that world affairs are enacted 
through the performance of daily practices by human actors. This thesis thus combines 
two-level game theory and practice theory in order to describe the practices of the 
EEAS during the negotiation of the EU-Cuba Political Dialogue and Cooperation 
Agreement. In terms of methodology, the objective is to gain empirical insight in the 
performance of practices which necessitated data acquisition from semi-structured 
qualitative interviews and text based primary sources. The data is subsequently 
interpreted through the combined perspective of the two-level game model and the core 
concepts of practice theory. The findings demonstrate that the practices of the EEAS 
were crucial in the negotiation of the PDCA. The practice-based analysis also suggests 
that practices render preferences dynamic which may relax the assumption of the EU 
being a tough negotiating partner. Finally, it is concluded that despite the 
methodological limitations, practice theory promises valuable perspectives for the 
implementation of the two-level game model.  
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1 Research Problem and Objective 
Since the creation of the ‘second pillar’ in 1991 by the Maastricht Treaty, more 
commonly known as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the European 
Union has sought to increase its influence and visibility in the international arena. The 
development of the institutional framework has culminated most recently in the 
establishment of the post of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy (HR/VP) and in the creation of the European External Action 
Service (EEAS) in 2009 and 2011 respectively. Although the degree of sovereign 
power delegation to the EU institutions – also called as supranationalism – in the field 
of foreign affairs remains limited; nonetheless, the EU possesses considerable 
capabilities to pursue semi-independent foreign policy goals on behalf of its Member 
States.  
The EEAS plays a crucial role in the fulfillment of these goals. It coordinates the 
activities of the over 140 EU delegations around the world (European Commission 
2016c) and oversees a number of core international policy areas including the  
promotion of human rights and democracy through comprehensive cooperation 
agreements. The enactment of these foreign policy initiatives requires the cooperation 
between the EEAS and the various international stakeholders which predisposes them 
to be positioned in bilateral or multilateral negotiations, often having the mandate to 
lead the negotiations on behalf of the EU. The practices of the EEAS in international 
negotiations therefore directly shape the EU’s stance in international affairs and defines 
its position vis-á-vis the rest of the major global actors as well as its own Member 
States. The role of EEAS in international negotiations is a highly under-researched area 
(Kostanyan 2014 p. 374). 
International negotiations research shows shortcomings – similarly to IR theories – 
in adequately explaining the EU’s foreign policy. Negotiations theory has traditionally 
focused nation-states as primary actors in international negotiations while it has sought 
to explain negotiation outcomes based on the realism and neo-realism driven concepts 
such as bargaining power, asymmetries, or material and military capabilities (see for 
example Habeeb 1988, Schelling 1980, Putnam 1988, Hopmann 1996). Although 
current international negotiations research avenues seem to be restricted in their ability 
to fully account for EU international negotiations activities, two-level game theory has 
proved valuable in this field. Nevertheless, the utilization of alternative complementary 
theoretical and methodological approaches are warranted to explain the EU’s 
international negotiation practices.  
A recent theoretical development has introduced a promising alternative approach 
to investigate international affairs which may potentially live up to the above 
challenges.  The so-called ‘practice turn’ established and coined by Schatzki, Knorr 
Cetina and Von Savigny (2000) has been utilized with growing popularity in the fields 
of international relations and diplomacy studies. One of the primary objectives of 
integrating practice theory in IR and diplomacy research is to take advantage of its 
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unorthodox theoretical, ontological, and epistemological tools to answer key questions 
and dilemmas. It not only provides a fresh ontology, but it also promises a highly 
empirical approach that penetrates the traditional units of analysis by inductively 
looking at how daily practices and the intersubjectivity behind them construct larger 
phenomena rather than using predetermined variables. Practice theory thus promotes a 
bottom-up approach which is furthermore complemented by the various methodologies 
it specifically advocates. Studies based on this approach have yielded interesting results 
and reinforced practice turn’s validity in the field of IR, at least for now.1 Practice 
theory’s popularity in IR resulted in its preliminary application in international 
negotiation research as well (Voeten 2011, Adler and Pouliot 2011a, Adler-Nissen and 
Pouliot 2014).  The evidence suggests that the field of international negotiations, more 
specifically two-level game theory could benefit from a more in-depth cross-
fertilization from practice theory.  
This thesis will thus investigate the negotiation practices of the EEAS in 
international bilateral negotiations. The negotiation of the Political Dialogue and 
Cooperation Agreement (PDCA) between Cuba and the European Union will provide 
the empirical case study. Accordingly, the research questions can be defined as follows:  
Q1: What is the added value of practice theory in the study of international 
negotiations? 
Q2: How can we describe the practices of EEAS in the negotiation of the PDCA?   
Q3: What conclusions can be drawn on EU international negotiations? 
First, answering these questions can provide better understanding on how the EEAS 
conducts international negotiations using practice theory. As the newly established 
diplomatic service of a supranational political entity, the EEAS is embedded in a highly 
unique political and institutional milieu. The EEAS thus lends itself particularly well 
for a practice approach; by focusing on the practices of EEAS diplomats, we may 
understand better how the EU negotiates with third parties. Therefore, the aim is to 
attain a deeper understanding on negotiation practices of the EEAS. 
Second, the research strategy and the consequent analyses may also shed light on 
the institutional functioning of the EEAS as well as its institutional interrelations. The 
practice of international negotiations is not simply what happens around the bargaining 
table with the representatives of one nation at each side of it. It includes the complex 
processes of conveying information, negotiating preferences, communicating 
willingness (or unwillingness) with stakeholders at home as well as other relevant 
parties at various levels. A practice approach may promote our understanding how 
interinstitutional practices can influence negotiations.   
Third and perhaps most importantly, the thesis aims to undertake a more abstract 
mission as well: to probe the applicability of practice theory in negotiations research 
and explore cross-fertilization between Putnam’s two-level game model and practice 
                                                 
1 See the section 2.2 for a more elaborate overview.  
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theory. While international negotiations may be considered as a subset field of IR, it 
nevertheless boasts with a long-standing and complex theoretical background and 
therefore it is well suited to be the subject of development and testing. This complexity 
can benefit from a bottom-up construction while international negotiations is a field 
which is especially warranted to be analyzed via the empirical points of view of the 
negotiators themselves. From this perspective as well, practice theory offers a 
promising analytical tool-set to conduct research in EU international negotiations. This 
approach – ideally – will contribute to our understanding of the EEAS, the EU as well 
as the field of international negotiations. 
The objectives serve both a descriptive (e.g. the constellation and interrelation of 
various negotiation practices) as well as an explanatory (e.g. the effects of practice-
based approach on negotiation research) purpose. The analysis will be conducted based 
on available primary sources, government documents, and data collected from 
interviews, as well as relevant secondary sources primarily in the form of research 
articles and books.  
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2 Theoretical Framework 
The main theoretical objective is to investigate the synergies between practice theory 
and negotiation studies. Considering the relatively young ‘practice turn’ in social 
sciences, I believe that this objective could contribute to the overall theoretical 
development of both practice and international negotiation theories by testing their 
scope and probing the plausibility of this approach (George and Bennett 2005 p. 51). 
The theoretical framework is thus designed to make a case for the successful utilization 
of practice theory in the field of international negotiations.  
2.1 Practice Theory – Definition and Core Concepts 
2.1.1 Defining Practice 
Practice theory, although rooted in many theoretical concepts like Bourdieusian social 
theories, Foucault’s cultural theories and discourse analysis, constructivism, and post-
structuralism (Bueger and Gadinger 2015), it has grown to be a self-standing theory 
with the so-called ‘practice turn’ introduced by Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina, and Savigny 
(2000). It does not provide a singular approach; instead, it offers a variety of theoretical 
approaches rooted in, inter alia, ethnomethodology, praxeology, individualism, and 
rational choice theory (Adler and Pouliot 2011a p. 3, Pouliot and Cornut 2015 p. 300, 
Schatzki et al. 2000); in other words, a “collection of sensitizing concepts” (Bueger and 
Gadinger 2014 p. 78). 
At the outset, a practice is often defined simply as arrays of human activity. Most 
practice theorists depart from Schatzki’s more composite definition which states that 
the “central core […] of practice theorists conceives of practices as embodied, 
materially mediated arrays of human activity centrally organized around shared 
practical understanding.” (Schatzki 2000a p. 11). Adler and Pouliot’s (2011a p. 4) 
approach integrates the social aspects of practice to define it as patterns of action that 
count as socially meaningful issues. This is in line with how Bueger and Gadinger 
(2015) clarify the basic consideration of practice as being patterns of activity that renew 
and reproduce social order. Reckwitz, on the other hand emphasizes the importance of 
interconnectedness between “forms of bodily activities, forms of mental activities, 
‘things’ and their use, a background knowledge in the form of understanding, know-
how, states of emotion and motivational knowledge.” (2002b). Practice theorists also 
often highlight the difference between a practice and practices, with the former being 
an overarching concept comprising of various actions. This distinction, however, is not 
retained in this thesis, therefore practice and practices will be used interchangeably. 
Nevertheless, I argue that we need more than a firm grasp on shared skills alone to 
adequately explain practices.  
A practice shall be defined as an interconnected constellation of patterned activities 
based on shared practical understandings and capable of producing socially meaningful 
collective accomplishments over time. Departing from this definition, the core 
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underlying concepts need to be explored in order to have analytical usefulness. This is 
crucial since practices are the smallest units of analysis in a practice-based research. 
Therefore, five core conceptual areas will serve as main pillars during the identification 
and analysis of negotiation practices: shared practical intelligibility, process, discourse, 
social relevance, and contexts.  
2.1.2 Practical Intelligibility and Intersubjectivity 
Schatzki argues (Schatzki 2000b p. 55) that human activities are driven by practical 
intelligibility, i.e. what specifically people do and what makes sense for them to do. 
While practical intelligibility is not the same as rationality, intelligibility still means a 
course of action that makes sense for a person to do, something that an actor performs 
knowingly and willingly.  
Practice theory puts emphasis on how action is understood and constituted, how 
things and objects are perceived. As Schatzki puts it, “the institution of meaning is the 
establishment of the fact that it [something] bears meaning.” (Schatzki 2000b p. 56). 
Since practices are enabled and enacted by people, these arrays of activity also confer 
subjective meanings on the aims and motivations of people; i.e. what disposes them to 
enact the practice itself (Barnes 2000 pp. 29-30). The meaning of a practice is 
subjectively perceived by others; however, it is the collective shared understanding of 
human actors which establishes an intersubjectivity that underlies all practices. This 
collective attribute means that practitioners mentally frame this practical intelligibility 
in a quasi-identical fashion. 
The intersubjectivity (i.e. the institution of meaning, shared understandings, 
collective know-hows etc.) underlying practices is an important factor in understanding 
the intricate relationship between practices and people. Intersubjectivism allows human 
agents, for example, to understand social order through the shared use of language and 
everyday communication (Bueger and Gadinger 2015, Reckwitz 2002b). Practices thus 
express a collective of meanings via practical intelligibility and it is the shared 
subjective understandings and skills that people rely on when carrying out actions. In 
addition, Barnes also argue that the joint enactment of these skills requires the constant 
coordination and propositional knowledge of each other and the relevant contextual 
settings (Barnes 2000). The underlying intersubjectivity informs practitioners on the 
purpose of practices and how they matter.  
Shared practical intelligibility can be conceived as being dependent upon norms or 
rules of correct or incorrect practice (Rouse 2000 p. 199). I argue that rules, norms, and 
formal customs are intrinsic in providing intelligible guidance to practitioners. As 
human beings learn, share and develop the skills required to perform practices, they 
simultaneously create implicit rules which have the capacity to provide adequate 
guidance for the continuous and proper exercise of those skills and practices. On the 
other hand, practices may also involve explicit rules which frame relevant practices in 
a way that enables people to follow those rules (Turner 2000 p. 129).  
In summary, practices are arrays of activity based on shared practical intelligibility. 
This signifies what actors do and what makes sense for them to do. Practices are enacted 
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based on collective understandings, skills, knowledge, and rules shared 
intersubjectively among other practitioners.  
2.1.3 Practices as Patterned Processes 
Routines and habitual behavior are important aspects of practices. As mentioned above, 
ideas, rules, norms, and culture are concepts which are articulated subjectively by a 
person’s mind and dictating one’s actions. Swidler argues that practice theory solves 
the difficulty of proving the causal link between individual thought and action by 
placing practices at the center. Instead of taking ideas as influencing factors of actions, 
human activity is rather considered as patterned practices. Practices thus obtain an 
“unconscious, automatic, un-thought character” (Swidler 2000 p. 83). This shift thus 
makes ideas, culture and values observable in the form of practices.  
Practices are thus patterned and processive. Practice is not a single ad-hoc action, it 
is a process based on interactions and shared understandings. The patterned quality of 
practices involves dynamic development over time through the execution of shared 
practices themselves. It is patterned over time and space and possesses a degree of 
regularity (Adler and Pouliot 2011b p. 7). Since practices are enacted in a process, 
practices evolve through dynamic interrelation. As Barnes notes, “The successful 
execution of routines at the collective level will involve the overriding and modification 
of routines at the individual level.” (Barnes 2000 p. 31).  
2.1.4 Discursive Practices 
Discourse analysis advocated foremost by Foucault has provided a strong conceptual 
background for the development of practice theory; hence the crossovers between the 
two theories (Reckwitz 2002a). However, many considerations distinguish it from 
practice theory. The focus on discourse and practices offered benefits in the study of 
meaning by eliminating the subjective understandings and the problem of linking 
thought and action. Discourse – the world of language, text, symbols etc. – 
complements practices well as it also departs from subjective ideas to a more objective 
analysis. This focus on ‘discursive practices’ eliminates the nigh-impossible task of 
identifying the causal link between ideas and action (Swidler 2000 pp. 84-86).  
Although Michel Foucault considered practice as part of discourse, for practice 
theorists practices are the main departure point and they reverse the hierarchy between 
the two notions (Neumann 2002 p. 630). In practice theory discourse succumbs to 
practices and the latter is thus being the favored concept over discourse. Discourse can 
be understood as static, “structured totalities of meaningful entities” while practices are 
more dynamic, changing and moving (Schatzki 2000b p. 53). Furthermore, in practice 
theory the status of discourse and language is less prominent, discursive practices are 
only one type among many others despite its usefulness in understanding the causality 
between human action and subjectivity (Reckwitz 2002b p. 254).  
In summary, practices are discursive. The use of texts, signs, language, symbols etc. 
– i.e. discursive elements – communicates intent and meaning to others. Since practice 
theory considers discourse in itself as practice, therefore meaning is carried and 
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transferred in and through practices. This underscores practical intelligibility being 
shared among practitioners, since “[i]n order for practices to make sense, then, 
practitioners must establish (contest, negotiate, and communicate) their significance.” 
(Adler and Pouliot 2011a p. 15). The interwoven character between practice and 
discourse establishes socially meaningful patterns. 
2.1.5 Social Relevance and Recognition 
Practice theory has highlighted in particular the social relevance of shared practices  
(Schatzki 2000a p. 13, 2000b pp. 50-51). Arrays of collective human activity based on 
shared skills and practical understandings form practices, and since that is where the 
social takes place, it is thus argued that social systems are “ongoing, self-reproducing 
arrays of shared practices” (Barnes 2000 p. 25). Since shared practices are realized by 
“interdependent social agents, linked by a profound mutual susceptibility” (Barnes 
2000 p. 33), they produce collective accomplishments (Barnes 2000 p. 31, Schatzki 
2000b pp. 60-61). The intersubjectivity of collective accomplishment affects the social 
manifold and thus becomes recognized and relevant. Practices are socially recognized 
forms of activity (Barnes 2000 p. 27), therefore, accomplishments have thus the power 
to induce change over time.  
Practices are socially recognized and reproduced. Practice theory states that the 
social is located within the field of practices. Individual social beings perform a 
multitude of practices which are capable of forming collective accomplishments based 
on shared propositional knowledge and competences. Since these accomplishments as 
well as (discursive) practices communicate meaning, they become socially recognized 
and relevant. Through this recognition, practices produce social order but since “it is 
also from practices that social change originates” (Adler and Pouliot 2011a p. 18), 
practices are therefore constantly being reproduced through the complex interrelation 
between them.  
2.1.6 Context as a Constellation of Practices 
Practices can be also thought of as overlapping structures when considering practices 
in terms of social order. Swidler argues that practices are generalizable processes that 
function in multiplicity and simultaneously, overlapping, and cross-influencing. This 
way these practice-structures facilitate the continuity and development of other 
practices. However, because of the overlapping and potentially complex nature of 
practices, the question arises regarding the interconnectedness and even potential 
hierarchy between them. Swidler explains this phenomenon with an example of an 
architectural design, in which the architect must consider various other practices that 
informs the final design, such as whether people sleep alone or together, the financial 
transactions taking place after completion of the building, or the ownership status of 
the house (Swidler 2000 p. 89). In consideration of this argument, it would follow that 
a practice comprises of a whole set of other larger and smaller practices. This 
observation brings forward the question of causality and influence between practices, 
i.e. what makes certain practices more dominant than others.  
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Practices are therefore contextual. As Schatzki notes, social order exists in the nexus 
of practices based on the complex interrelation of a myriad of arrays of activity 
(Schatzki 2000b p. 63). Within this context practices are correlated and interwoven 
horizontally and vertically as well. A practice may be based upon a constellation of 
other practices forming a certain hierarchy.  
2.2 Practice Theory and Two-level Games  
One of the most influential effects of practice theory since the ‘practice turn’ has been 
its widespread utilization in international relations (IR) theory. Ripsman, for example, 
investigates the practice of bipartisanship in Congress to bridge the gap between agency 
and structure (Ripsman 2011) while diplomacy studies have extensively leaned on the 
use of practice theory to explain EU politics in Brussels (Cornut 2015, Kuus 2015, 
Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014, Neumann 2002, Wiseman 2015). Practice-based 
research has been applied in the field of EU foreign policy as well. Lequesne 
demonstrates how practices structure professional culture within the EEAS (Lequesne 
2015) while others have explored practices in European security community building, 
counter-piracy missions, and the complex interaction between the EU and NATO 
(Bueger 2016, Græger 2016, 2017, Bremberg 2015).  
Preliminary steps have been taken to integrate practice theory in negotiation research 
as well. A study by Voeten illustrates the utility of a practice approach in studying 
strategic bargaining and political manipulation in the United Nations General Assembly 
(Voeten 2011). Another article by Adler and Pouliot cast Schelling’s seminal work on 
bargaining in a practice light by explaining bargaining from the perspective of practice 
concepts, i.e. collective knowledge, patterned performance and social relevance (Adler 
and Pouliot 2011a). Finally, a study by Adler-Nissen and Pouliot utilized practice 
theory to explain how power is associated with diplomatic struggles for competence in 
multilateral settings (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014).  
 Decades of international negotiation research and case-study analysis has resulted 
in a rich, complex, and invaluable body of literature. Many studies focused on simple 
bilateral models of bargaining based on game theoretic models and their relevance on 
international strategic interaction (Schelling 1980, Hopmann 1996). Researchers have 
often investigated the domestic political arena and its effects on international 
negotiations based on a bureaucratic politics or a two-level game model (Allison and 
Zelikow 1999, Putnam 1988). Other studies have focused specifically on negotiator 
behaviors reflected in bargaining strategies ranging from cooperative styles to more 
conflictual non-cooperative strategies (Walton and McKersie 1965, Raiffa 1982, Fisher 
et al. 1991, Elgström and Jönsson 2000, Müller 2004) while the psychological aspects 
of negotiator behavior have also acquired academic attention (Aquilar and Galluccio 
2008). These rough contours are only the tip of the iceberg of a complex and 
disintegrated academic field. The various approaches to negotiation research remain 
unconnected and isolated (Odell 2010). Practice theory could be potentially valuable 
for the field of international negotiations to bridge gaps and connect approaches.  
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2.2.1 Two-level Game Theory 
Among the multitude of negotiation theories, not many are suitable to explain single-
handedly the proposed research questions. The two-level game theory, however, 
possesses the necessary theoretical qualities. It argues that the international and 
domestic political arenas are closely intertwined and that international negotiations 
cannot be understood without taking into account the domestic interests, preferences, 
and coalitions as well as the pressures exerted by them. While many “pure systemic 
theories” have discussed the effects of domestic politics on international relations, 
realist, liberal interdependence theories, and international political economy variants 
consider the level of analysis to be focused on the international scene (Moravcsik 1993 
pp. 7-13). Two-level game theory, on the other hand, argues that statesmen pursue 
interests at the domestic and international arenas at the same time, cross-influencing 
and manipulating interests. Two-level game approach is a theory of international 
bargaining (Moravcsik 1993 PP. 16-17). Parties identify and approach each other’s 
interests within the bargaining space at the international level in order to reach an 
agreement acceptable for each party’s domestic constituents (Putnam 1988). Putnam 
laid down the conceptual elements of this model which were applied and tested in 
various case-studies effectively (Putnam 1993, Carment and James 1996, Knopf 1993, 
Hurst 2016) and the model was also developed and used extensively to explain EU 
(international) negotiation processes (Patterson 1997, Collinson 1999, Falkner 2002, 
Hubel 2004, Larsén 2007, Ki-Sik and Hyun-Jung 2014, Reslow and Vink 2015, 
Dimitrova and Steunenberg 2017). In light of the field’s disintegration, Odell argues 
that a multi-level game model has the potential to integrate some of the distinct core 
elements of negotiation theory (Odell 2010 pp. 626-627).  
Putnam’s two-level game framework distinguishes between Level I, where the 
international negotiations take place, and Level II, the domestic arenas where each 
party seeks to ratify the agreement. The analysis of the international bargaining case in 
a two-level game theory model is often carried out in two phases: the phase of 
international bargaining and the phase of ratification. While Putnam realizes these 
processes may happen in simultaneous conjunction, this dual distinction was 
nevertheless retained for expository purposes (Moravcsik 1993 p. 23, Putnam 1988 p. 
436). At Level I, negotiators utilize bargaining strategies aimed at maximizing the 
results in order to satisfy domestic groups and pressures while at Level II negotiators 
attempt to manipulate constraints and interests in order to find acceptable agreements 
at the international level. Theoretically, the two levels are linked by the concept of 
ratification at Level II, a process by which Putnam means any formal or informal 
process that is required for the agreement to be implemented and accepted. Decision 
makers are thus continuously influenced and pressured by interest groups, lobbies to 
adopt favorable policies. Ratification constrains Level I negotiations since both parties 
have to get the agreement accepted by their respective domestic groups and 
stakeholders before it can be finalized. This also means that any modification to the 
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preliminary agreement will have to be renegotiated accordingly at Level I before 
ratified at Level II (Putnam 1988 pp. 436-437).  
The range of agreements negotiated at Level I still ratifiable at Level II is referred 
to as a win-set. When parties negotiate at the international level, both parties converge 
to each other’s interests without giving up matters of priority. By definition, the win-
sets of both parties need to overlap for an agreement to exist. Two-level game theory 
advances two basic arguments concerning the size of win-sets: 1) the larger the parties’ 
win-sets the more likely it is that Level I negotiations will have a successful outcome 
proportionately reducing the chances for defection; 2) the size of the relative win-sets 
will determine the distribution of joint-gains from the agreement (Moravcsik 1993 p. 
28).  
Based on the first argument, successful Level I negotiations correlate strongly with 
the likeliness of voluntary or involuntary defection. While voluntary defection means 
the intentional reneging on the agreement by one party, involuntary defection points to 
the inability of one party to get domestic constituencies to agree on the deal brokered 
at Level I. Credibility of the negotiators is therefore crucial, they must demonstrate 
their ability to successfully negotiate at Level II in order for negotiations to be 
successful at Level I. Failed ratification may still happen which is closely related to the 
uncertainty about the contours of possible win-sets at both sides (Putnam 1988 p. 339).  
Conversely, based on the second argument above, win-set size also influences the 
distribution of joint gains. If one party’s perceived win-set size is relatively large, that 
party may be expected to converge more while the party with a smaller win-set size is 
enabled to concede less. This translates into bargaining power potentially leading to an 
asymmetrical situation where one party’s constrained win-set may provide a bargaining 
advantage at Level I which might affect the distribution of gains at the end (Putnam 
1988 pp. 439-440). This is confirmed for example by the outcome of the post-Lomé 
negotiation process between the EU and the ACP Group where the EU’s rigid mandates 
allowed the EU to achieve its goals through hard bargaining (Elgström 2005) or by the 
tight interest group control in EU-South Africa negotiations (Larsén 2007). On the other 
hand, smaller win-sets may also reduce reaching agreement at Level I. 
According to Putnam, win-sets are determined by three sets of factors: 1) Level II 
preferences and coalitions, 2) Level II institutions and 3) Level I negotiation strategies. 
First, domestic preferences are often viewed at the outset in relation to the status-quo 
of no-agreement: the smaller cost of no-agreement the smaller is the win-set, while the 
larger the benefits of an agreement the larger will be the win-set as well (Moravcsik 
1993 p. 23). Consequently, negotiators will try to manipulate Level II preferences and 
coalitions in order facilitate agreement at the international level which strongly 
correlates with the size of the win-set. The cost of no-agreement may largely vary 
between Level II stakeholders and therefore various groups may lobby for or fight 
against the agreement. As such, negotiators may try to influence the cost of no-
agreement for the stakeholders to facilitate an agreement by e.g. manipulating domestic 
preferences and interest groups (Moravcsik 1993 pp. 24-25). Interest divergence is 
especially pronounced in multi-issue negotiations where different groups have vested 
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interests heterogeneously in various parts of the agreement and possess various degrees 
of influence. Strong domestic divisions can decrease ratification success since the range 
of agreements at Level I will most likely be unacceptable for one or more parties. 
However, divisions can also provide opportunities for the chief negotiator to influence 
domestic interests through issue linkages negotiated at Level I (Putnam 1988 pp. 443-
444).  
Second, Level II institutional contexts are crucial in terms of ratification and internal 
negotiations. Democratic ratification processes, such as the requirement for unanimous 
vote in the Council of the EU on external affairs, tend to make the adoption of Level I 
agreements more difficult. Consequently, the stronger one party’s domestic autonomy, 
i.e. its independence from formal institutional processes, the larger its win-set size and 
the weaker its bargaining position since it cannot refer to its domestic pressures in order 
to successfully argue against a concession. Conversely, strong institutions can also limit 
negotiators opportunities to manipulate domestic constraints and therefore reducing her 
autonomy (Moravcsik 1993 p. 25). One the other hand, as seen from the above 
examples, rigid institutional context at Level II reduces win-set size and thus provides 
bargaining advantage during international negotiations.  
Third, Level I negotiators strategies will also influence the overlap of win-sets and 
the possibility of agreement. Since the relative win-set sizes influence the distribution 
of joint gains, each negotiator thus has an interest in increasing the other side’s win-set 
size in order to maximize its own gains from the agreement. However, with regard to 
his own win-set, the negotiator faces a usual bargaining dilemma: gain maximization 
without breaking down negotiations (Putnam 1988 pp. 450). This correlates strongly 
with the dilemma of traditional forms of bargaining in which one party’s gain 
maximizing behavior shrinks bargaining space to a degree where agreement is no 
longer available (Hopmann 1996 pp. 59-60) – i.e. win-sets don’t overlap anymore. 
However, these strategies are unlikely to suffice in negotiations characterized by 
multiple interdependent issues and strong misaligned preferences and would suggest 
the need for problem-solving type tactics (Hopmann 1996 pp. 94-95). This would 
necessitate the careful (re)consideration and investigation of win-set determination and 
bargaining strategies at Level I suggested by two-level game theory. Level I bargaining 
strategies will also depend on the negotiator’s interests during negotiations vis-á-vis the 
preferences of its own domestic interest groups. In other words, if the negotiator’s 
preferences align strongly with those of its domestic pressure groups, then the 
manipulation of its own win-set size will be unlikely.  
The application of the two-level game model in EU international negotiations 
analysis necessitated modifications to account for the EU’s complex polity. Many 
researchers argued that since the EU in itself constitutes an arena for international 
negotiations, the model was needed to be re-conceptualized as an aggregate of three 
levels: Level I as the international bargaining, Level II as the EU-level negotiations 
between institutions and Member States, and Level III for Member State domestic 
politics or intra-Commission negotiations (Collinson 1999, Hubel 2004, Larsén 2007). 
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However, a three-level distinction will not be utilized in this thesis since the cross-
application of practice and two-level game theories is already a complex endeavor. 
2.2.2 Bringing in Practices  
As argued above, practice theory offers a unique set of ontological and empirical 
commitments which may bear important complementary value to negotiations theory. 
How do the core concepts of practice theory reformulate international negotiations 
construed as Putnam’s two-level game? To reiterate the core concepts of practice theory 
outlined above, a practice is based on shared practical intelligibility, it is discursive, 
patterned, contextual, and socially recognized. These concepts will thus serve as the 
pillars for the alternative approach to international negotiations.  
First, the practice of international negotiations is based on shared practical 
intelligibility. Defining it simply as what people specifically do and what makes sense 
to do, practical intelligibility informs practitioners on how to proceed in certain 
bargaining situations. Two-level game theory argues that party A will attempt to 
increase the size of party B’s win-set in order to maximize its own gains during 
international negotiations. This requires knowledge on B’s domestic affairs, the skills 
to interpret it and utilize it increase B’s win-set and being shared among the key 
stakeholders of both parties. For example, offering a side deal to one of B’s domestic 
interest groups in order to reduce the exerted pressures would increase B’s overall win-
set size. However, in order for party A to grasp why this is an adequate strategy, it needs 
to possess the necessary background knowledge and to understand the preferences and 
needs of B’s domestic interest group. This is not a simple calculation of gains and 
losses, it is the manifestation of embedded know-how, practical knowledge, skills and 
implicit rules which allow party A to act accordingly, e.g. to carry out a side-deal. Since 
party A’s side-deal changes B’s domestic dynamics, it will no longer make sense for 
B’s interest group exert pressure and both parties can converge towards an acceptable 
agreement within the overlap of their respective win-sets. All these actions and 
practices are infused with practical intelligibility and common background 
understandings.  
Second, the practice of international negotiations is discursive. The use of symbols, 
texts, language permeates every aspect of this practice. The communication of interests, 
internal bargaining, manipulation are all fundamentally discursive which is the primary 
way to transfer meaning. The various discursive practices of the parties will inform one 
another regarding interests and appropriate next steps. As discursive action in itself is 
a practice, actors understanding and expectations are thus embedded in practices 
themselves and as such they become fundamentally communicative, to which Schelling 
referred to as ‘tacit bargaining’ (Schelling 1980). 
Third, the practice of international negotiations is socially recognized and 
reproduced. Social recognition is well represented by the domestic pressures put in 
place by interest groups. The various stakeholders share the knowledge with the 
negotiating parties and thus understand the outcomes of the potential agreement. They 
recognize its relevance and they put pressure on the negotiating parties if they are 
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unsatisfied with potential outcomes. By influencing agendas and the course of the 
negotiations, the practice is altered and produces another outcome bearing modified 
recognition. Thus, it becomes reproduced. It is a process, dynamic in nature through 
the interaction and interrelation of various practices that constantly produce socially 
relevant meanings and outcomes. International bargaining also create social reality by 
the inarticulate formulation of norms, rules of the game and traditions (Adler and 
Pouliot 2011a p. 12). This is also an integral part of parties to understand institutional 
preferences and inter-institutional tensions which, for example, was crucially important 
during the EU-Moldova negotiation process (Kostanyan 2014). The process of 
international negotiations thus bears social relevance of varying degree to domestic and 
international groups who will shape their own actions accordingly.  
Fourth, the practice of international negotiations is patterned and processive. This 
pattern manifests itself both temporally and spatially. Actors negotiate at the 
international level trying the utilize bargaining strategies to maximize gains and 
manipulate domestic pressures to facilitate ratification. These practices happen 
consecutively and over time. Parties might reach an agreement after several rounds of 
negotiations at the international level while communication with domestic 
constituencies and internal bargaining underscores the process in its length. The 
concessions and convergence at the international level can only happen in relation to 
the practices of the other party. Concessions given at Level I communicates intent and 
incentivizes some form of reaction. Even the prior practices of the parties will have an 
effect on the negotiations at both Levels, thus practices have a t – 1/+ 1 value being 
either informed by previous practices or extending into the future having repercussions 
later in time (Adler and Pouliot 2011a p. 12).   
Fifth, the practice of international negotiations is contextual. International 
negotiations happen based on the dynamic interrelation of a constellation of various 
other practices. Two-level game includes, inter alia, the manipulation of domestic 
groups, strategic bargaining at the international level, the issuance of threats and 
promises, the offering of side deals and the constant internal negotiations with core 
stakeholders. The various activities form a hierarchy in which the successful internal 
negotiation of an offer facilitates the performance of reaching an agreement at Level I 
and ratify it at Level II having already been pre-negotiated with domestic actors. The 
context of practices not only means the constellation and hierarchy of various practices, 
but also the various artifacts, institutions and rules through which they coexist. 
Bargaining practices are capable of creating and reproducing social know-hows and 
rules of the game, i.e. tacit understandings underlying practical intelligibility, which 
informs practitioners how to proceed. These rules, however, also govern 
institutionalized activities and negotiation practices in an explicit manner. The process 
of ratification where voting rules are of crucial importance would be perhaps the most 
obvious example. Therefore, the constellation of practices throughout the levels of 
negotiations happen in a context of rules, norms, institutions, and other artifacts which 
serve as a conductor for continuous performance. 
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International negotiations submit itself well to the conceptual considerations of 
practice theory. However, the question is not whether international negotiations or two-
level games can be fitted to the concepts of practice, but rather how these concepts 
promote a different understanding of negotiations theory.  
2.2.3 A Practice-theoretical Reconsideration of Two-Level Games 
The scientific literature on international practices has clearly shown that the utility of 
practice theory in IR does not depend on the reconceptualization of the definition of 
practice, but rather on the successful operationalization of the concepts in relation to 
the theories of IR. The case is the same with negotiations theory. Using the core 
commitments of practice theory in negotiations, some of the main tenets of the two-
level game theory may be reconsidered.  
At the very outset, two-level game is essentially considered as an aggregate of two 
sequential stages for expository purposes: the bargaining phase and the ratification 
phase. Practice theory would suggest considering both the bargaining and ratification 
phases as practices. Recall that practices are patterned and processive over time and 
space. The multiplicity of socially recognized practices is dynamically interrelated and 
it informs practitioners. As such, practices are socially reproduced which fosters and 
stabilizes change. The ratification process directly informs the win-set from the outset 
throughout the conclusion of the negotiations by outlining the set of arrangements 
acceptable for a negotiating party’s domestic constituencies. Parties negotiate in light 
of what will be acceptable at the end. The various human practices constrict and expand 
the win-sets over time and thus rendering the notion of ratification a dynamic concept 
that is plied over time via the interplay of a constellation of different practices. In this 
way, bargaining at Level I will be regularly informed by the ratification process and the 
adjoining context of practices, such as manipulation of preferences, intra- and inter-
institutional coordination or interest group pressures. Therefore, looking at practices 
we are better suited to reconstruct the dynamic interplay between ratification and 
international bargaining. 
Everyday human activities and practices based on intersubjective knowledge across 
levels build up the entire practice of international negotiations. Domestic preferences 
and pressure groups have agendas which are based on practical intelligibility. They 
communicate intent through various channels and discursive practices. Only by looking 
at the actual practices of stakeholders can we reconstruct what lies behind domestic 
interests, how they are socially constituted in and through practices, and which 
practices instantiate changes in accordance with the preferences. Moreover, these 
actions and practices are informed by implicit rules (i.e. rules of the game, informal 
channels, acceptable manners of political pressuring etc.) as well as explicit rules 
(formal negotiating directives, parliamentary hearings, interim voting etc.). Statesmen 
and negotiators – amid the context of practices – will gauge the situation and make 
adequate calculations based on intersubjective propositional knowledge of what would 
be ratifiable at the end by their constituencies and at the same time acceptable for the 
other side as well.  
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Two-level game theory assumes preferences of domestic groups and the costs of 
status-quo remain unchanged throughout negotiations (Moravcsik 1993 p. 24). I would 
argue that domestic interest groups’ preferences are communicated through practices. 
Since practices are dynamic and subject to change due to its contextuality and patterned 
quality, consequently preferences also change over time. A practice logic highlights the 
inherent change-inducing effects of various practices. In the case of the EU, for 
example, at the outset of an international negotiation process the Council of the EU 
issues negotiating directives to the chief negotiator. This practice is a manifestation and 
communication of various embedded interests stemming from Member States, EU 
institutions, civil groups and other relevant parties; preferences which possess cultural, 
historical, political memory and are informed by the past practices of the involved 
stakeholders. Pre-negotiations thus signify intersubjectivity, collective action, and 
relevant ex post and ex ante patterns. However, political influence of domestic interests 
comes to life in and through practices, they are socially recognized, reproduced, and 
change over time. Therefore, practices like interest group manipulation can influence 
intersubjective preferences and win-sets, even despite rigid negotiating directives. A 
practical consideration thus contradicts one time rational calculations of the costs of 
no-agreement and makes the changes of preferences and interests observable by 
recreating larger phenomena through practices. 
‘Moving up’ one step from the domestic arena to the interrelation between the two 
levels, the statesman is argued to be the central strategic actor between the two levels. 
Two-level games’ assumptions about the chief negotiator is rooted in principal-agent 
theory (Putnam 1988 pp. 456-457), suggesting the agent’s and principal’s interests do 
not necessarily overlap and consequently negotiators pursue their own set of interests. 
Difficulties arise from superimposing the principal-agent dichotomy on negotiations, 
namely the complex interest system stemming from having multiple principals and 
agents at the same time (Kurian 2011 p. 1353) which is not uncommon in international 
negotiations. Instead of attempting to disentangle a potential Gordian Knot, a practice 
approach would instead emphasize the intersubjective nature of practices at and across 
both levels. Practical intelligibility reflects interests and preferences in and through the 
enactment of a practice. Practitioners carry out domestic interest manipulation in 
socially recognizable ways since collective propositional knowledge is shared by both 
agent and principal, thus making practice transcend both categories. The in-depth 
analysis of domestic and international bargaining practices embedded in a context of 
(implicit and explicit) rules, institutional settings, and a constellation of interrelated 
practices reveals the diffusion of intersubjective interests. Finally, since the 
simultaneous double-edged calculations of domestic and international interests 
constitute the background knowledge of practices at both levels, a practice approach 
also sheds light on the problematic notion of how the two arenas are linked (Collinson 
1999 p. 219). 
This leads to the rational-choice considerations. Analysis of Level I negotiations 
favors assumptions that parties will always seek gain maximization in a distributive 
style negotiation in which the party with the more constrained domestic win-set gains 
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more than the party with a larger win-set. However, not only does this approach exclude 
non-zero sum bargaining scenarios, but this line of thought also disregards the 
preponderance of shared know-how, collective knowledge, and their effects on social 
action (Pouliot 2010 p. 12). Not everything is and can be calculated, many decisions 
are taken based on implicit rules which practitioners tacitly follow based on experience 
and adequate background knowledge. Practical intelligibility in two-level game 
negotiations is not only shared vertically at one side of the table, but also horizontally 
across the table, i.e. with the other negotiating party. This is especially relevant in multi-
issue negotiations, where practical intelligibility dictates more confrontational style 
behavior in certain issues while it promotes value-creating tactics in others. 
Ontologically practice theory would rather look at the performed practices and ask why 
those actions made sense in those circumstances.  
While multi-level game approaches are useful in explaining international 
negotiations and outcomes, I believe that practice theory renders the analytical 
designation of ‘levels’ somewhat redundant. Practice theory promotes aggregation, as 
Bueger and Gadinger note, its intention “is to keep ontology flat and re-conceptualize 
the ideas behind such constructions. Indeed, there is no such thing as micro, macro, 
local or global; they are not naturally given.” Two-level game theory offers a valid 
solution to the “level-of-analysis problem” often encountered in explanations of 
interstate relations: two-level game theory analyzes the international, the domestic and 
the individual levels simultaneously (Moravcsik 1993 p. 5). Nevertheless, it lacks 
practice theory’s ontological and methodological commitments to fully achieve this 
ambition. Practice theory takes practices as the smallest unit of analysis. In international 
negotiations, as briefly discussed above, many practices happen at multiple levels or 
simply transcend levels inconspicuously; it disregards levels altogether. Nevertheless, 
as two-level game intends to highlight the inter-influencing relations between the 
international and the domestic levels, the designation will be retained for expository 
purposes.  
2.3 Summary and Hypothesis 
Two-level game theory is a useful system for analyzing EU international negotiations. 
However, the EU’s complex polity challenges some of its assumptions which 
necessitates an alternative approach. The theoretical framework of this thesis therefore 
combines the added values of practice theory regarding two-level game theory. I 
applied the core concepts of practice to re-conceptualize assumptions and to describe 
how this might relate to EU negotiations. The concepts of practical intelligibility, 
discursivity, patterns, social recognition and reproduction, and contextuality 
underscore the validity of negotiation practices as the units of analysis.  
Some researchers criticize the added values of practice theory. Ringmar calls into 
question its fundamental objectives as a new “academic study of international relations” 
(Ringmar 2014 p. 21-23) while Kustermans simply concludes that “I do not think that 
there is one coherent practice turn, and given the argument in the paper, I do not think 
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that there can ever be one.” (Kustermans 2016 pp. 195-196). On the other hand, practice 
theory can also promote conversations across methodologies (Kratochwil 2011 p. 58). 
Practice theory’s incoherence is argued to be its analytical strength, albeit within well-
defined core concepts and theoretical boundaries (Bueger and Gadinger 2014 p. 13) 
which is precisely the reason why I argue that practice theory’s core concepts are 
transferable into two-level games as well. For this reason, practice theory seems 
equipped to explore the negotiation practices of the EEAS. Therefore, I hypothesize 
that practice theory can synergize well with two-level games to produce unique results 
for EU international negotiation research. 
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3 Methodology 
One of the most basic methodological tenets of practice theory is that the various social 
and international phenomena cannot be understood from books conducting “armchair 
analysis” (Neumann 2002 p. 628). It rather argues that practices need to be observed, 
followed, immersed in, and ultimately practiced. Practice theory focuses on what actors 
say and do (Bueger and Gadinger 2014 p. 3). However, although practice theoretical 
discussions are vast, its methodological dimensions are much less explored. The 
scientific literature boasts with a diverse, yet disintegrated set of methods. Whether one 
emphasizes praxeology, ethnomethodology or a Bourdieusian framework, there is one 
thing practice theorists generally agree on: no universally supreme methodology exists 
for practice-theoretical research (Adler and Pouliot 2011b p. 22, Bueger and Gadinger 
2014 p. 77).  
Despite the lack of coherent practice-methodologies, Vincent Pouliot’s 
‘sobjectivism’ (Pouliot 2010) and ‘practice-tracing’ (Pouliot 2014) are welcome 
exceptions. Having strong roots in the Bourdiesian framework, constructivist and 
process-tracing methodologies, Pouliot’s approach promote a number of common 
commitments. I will first describe this framework and then re-adapt the findings into 
one aggregate methodological framework tailored to conduct practice-oriented analysis 
of negotiations.  
In addition to its strong empirical focus, practice research offers a heuristic device 
as a theory (Bueger and Gadinger 2015 p. 457) which promotes the inductive 
construction of new variables and causal mechanisms to explain social phenomena 
(George and Bennett 2005 p. 94) in order to “come to deeper understanding of how the 
world works in and through practices” (Bueger and Gadinger 2014 p. 4). As such, it 
principally constitutes an interpretative research methodology (Bueger and Gadinger 
2015 p. 457, 2014 p. 80).  
3.1 Pouliot’s Methodological Framework  
The principal logic behind Pouliot’s framework is the intent to grasp subjectivity, 
intersubjectivity, and to objectify the background knowledge of practices with the 
simultaneous use of a variety of methods. The methodology consists of three main steps 
each possessing a distinct set of methods: induction, interpretation, and historicizing. 
While these stages are presented in order, this is by no means a rigid sequence; the 
methodology encourages moving back and forth between the stages as the researcher 
deems it necessary (Pouliot 2010 p. 65).   
First, the researcher needs to inductively map practical intelligibility and the 
underlying subjectivity of practitioners (Pouliot 2010 p. 59). Since meaning is 
constituted and transferred through practices, getting immersed in the context of 
practices is crucial to acquiesce the underlying subjective realities, knowledge and 
tacit-know how of the actors. There are a variety of methods available for carrying out 
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this phase, including ethnomethodology (Pouliot 2010 p. 67), participant observation, 
qualitative interviews, textual analysis of relevant written materials (Pouliot 2013 pp. 
47-48), or even less conventional techniques such as shadowing (Bueger and Gadinger 
2014 p. 88). The main objective here is to get as close to practices as possible in order 
to ascertain the practical intelligibility and thus reconstructing practices as units of 
analysis (Pouliot 2014 p. 250). 
Second, after having completed material acquisition and mapped practices, the 
researcher needs to interpret the observations. The interpretative process fundamentally 
aims to establish a wider context through the recovery of shared meanings, 
intersubjective contexts, and tacit know-hows (Pouliot 2010 p. 72). Practices are 
discursive; therefore, the contextual meanings may be discovered through the 
interpretation of signs, texts, symbols, speeches, stories etc. This stage relies heavily 
on Bourdieu’s discourse analysis and what Pouliot terms ‘practice analysis’ (Pouliot 
2010). The aim is to objectify the findings and reconstruct practical intelligibility and 
intersubjectivity. Although qualitative interviews are considered a valuable research 
method (George and Bennett 2005 pp. 21-22, Hopmann 2002 p. 76, Pouliot 2013 p. 
51); however, it does not offer direct insight into the practice in question, but rather the 
subjective representation thereof which necessitates the careful interpretation of the 
data (Bueger and Gadinger 2015 p. 457). Unlike the positivist models of interviewing, 
where the desired information is assumed to exist in the minds of the interviewees based 
on facts (Rowley 2012 p. 270), practice theoretical interpretation wishes to look behind 
practices to understand the underlying intelligibility, i.e. where actors come from rather 
than what they actually discuss (Pouliot 2010 p. 68). Norms and rules are often well-
articulated, tacit knowledge and common understandings are on the other hand invisible 
concepts embedded in practices and unconsciously interpreted by practitioners (Pouliot 
2010 p. 51). It is Janus-faced in that background knowledge is both intersubjective, but 
at the same time intersubjectivity is interpreted subjectively (Pouliot 2010 p. 66).  
Third, the methodology integrates a historical approach in order to shed light on the 
causal links of practice (Pouliot 2010 p. 75). Recall that practices are patterned over 
time and space which equips them with generative power. This quality renders practices 
well-suited for a historical approach further objectifying the findings by demonstrating 
the temporal and logical causality between practices. The abstraction of these causal 
links would then allow the results to be carried over to other cases based on analytical 
generalization. Using the method of practice tracing – an interpretative form of process 
tracing taking practices as units of analysis – enables the recovery of these objectives. 
It also elucidates social ontologies to establish causalities and moves the findings up 
the ladder of abstraction in order generalize the results for an across-the-cases 
application (Pouliot 2014). 
This elaborate methodological framework of practice theory heralds apparent 
challenges. The sheer complexity of methods and commitments of the above practice 
methodology risks ending up in a highly disintegrated yet shallow analysis. This would 
lead to falling between two stools by sacrificing parsimony without attaining 
generalizability. Ripsman nonetheless underlines practice theory’s methodological 
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value emphasizing that “while parsimony is helpful, explanatory power is critical. 
Sacrificing parsimony for theories that explain more and resolve critical puzzles is more 
useful for our understanding of international politics.” (Ripsman 2011 p. 223). To 
address this challenge, this thesis integrates a re-conceptualized version of Pouliot’s 
methodology by integrating two-level game model as a tool for interpretation. The 
added value of a practice approach lies in explaining the intersubjective causalities 
behind the negotiation process, while two-level game theory provides expository tools 
to locate practices and interpret them according to its main tenets. Negotiation research 
integrates many of the methods described above (Hopmann 2002) which further 
suggests the validity of integration.  
3.2 Reformulated Methodology and Method Selection 
Pouliot’s methodology requires the use of a variety of research techniques at each 
methodological stage, as shown above. These methods are complementary; however, 
each stage – induction, interpretation, historicizing – presents empirical challenges 
which requires the specification of proper method selection.  
The primary objective of the first stage is to inductively immerse oneself in the 
relevant practices and to grasp their meanings through a variety of research techniques. 
Participant observation and shadowing are perhaps the most ideal tools for a researcher 
to get immersed in any practice. However, this kind of field-work comes with serious 
impediments, such as restricted access and costly implementation (Bueger and 
Gadinger 2015 p. 457). Understandably, the scope of this thesis precludes me from 
observing several years-long bilateral negotiations due to the limits of financial 
resources and time. This leaves semi-structured qualitative interviews and text analysis 
as the main sources of information regarding the selected case.   
Pouliot suggests several interview designs that helps the researcher reconstruct 
background knowledge and practical intelligibility. The researcher can ask 
interviewees to recount daily practices, meetings, document drafting etc. to gain an 
insight what practitioners actually do. Researchers can also ask the interviewees to 
describe other practitioners’ actions or he/she can also devise an abstract scenario to 
ascertain how the practitioner would act in such a situation. The point is to minimalize 
personal bias and potential misleading by the interviewee, meanwhile gaining an 
insider’s point of view of ‘how things are done’ (Pouliot 2013 p. 49). Further 
impediments may arise during the interview process since international negotiations 
are often highly sensitive which can inhibit information sharing. 
Although performing a practice-theoretical interview method features certain unique 
characteristics (especially during the interpretation phase – see below), the principal 
rules of conducting qualitative interviews apply nonetheless. These guidelines concern 
issues such as drafting well-formulated script, utilizing open-ended broad questions 
(Jacob and Furgerson 2012 pp. 3-4), careful selection of interviewees, maintaining the 
flow of the conversation, careful transcription and organization of the data, the proper 
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interpretation of the information (Rowley 2012) and triangulation (Diefenbach 2009 p. 
882, Hopmann 2002 p. 76, Pouliot 2010 p. 71).  
When it comes to textual analysis, the researcher needs to acquire material that 
complements interviews and provides account of practices. Several textual genres 
suffice for this purpose including, inter alia, diaries, memoirs, reports, meeting minutes, 
proposals, court cases, manuals, recordings, diplomatic cables or correspondence 
(Pouliot 2013 p. 49, 2014 p. 249).  
The second stage, interpretation, will follow practice theory’s core commitments, 
but it will also integrate a two-level game perspective. Pouliot’s framework 
concentrates on discourse and practice analysis reconstruct intersubjective contexts 
(Pouliot 2010 p. 72). Instead of practice analysis, interpretation will be achieved by 1) 
locating the proper negotiation practices based on the two-level game model and by 2) 
reinterpreting negotiation concepts such as ratification, win-set sizes, and preference 
manipulation using the core concepts of practice theory. This process will inform 
intersubjectivity underlying the subjective interpretations of interviewees and placing 
the textual material accordingly.  
The two-level game model informs the interpretative stage by applying its 
expository levels of analysis. Furthermore, it also pinpoints how the contents of textual 
material and government documents should be understood from a negotiations point of 
view. At the same time, interpretation will also focus on practical intelligibility, 
discursivity, patterns and processes, social relevance, and contexts – i.e. the core 
concepts of a practice. Interpretation will thus integrate the theoretical concepts of both 
fields.  
The third stage aims to further objectivize interpretation by reaching general 
assumptions. Instead of integrating practice-tracing, generalization will be attained by 
testing the hypotheses of Putnam’s two-level game theory based practice-based 
interpretation. This process will inform how the results may be used in future research 
and re-conceptualize the main assumptions of the two-level game model with the use 
of negotiation practices. Ultimately, this methodology will allow us to draw 
conclusions on the validity of the cross-fertilization between practice and negotiation 
theories.  
3.3 Research Strategy and Design 
At the outset, the proper level of aggregation is crucial in the determining the right 
research strategy. It is not naturally given to explain extensive social phenomena by 
studying something as small as practice (Bueger and Gadinger 2014 p. 65). 
Methodologically, it is also important to ask what is included in a practice and what is 
outside of its borders. Without it, we could just look at “what everyone ‘does’ and call 
it ‘practice’” (Karp 2012 p. 970). The level of aggregation, i.e. the scope of the 
hierarchy of practices we take, really depends on the research object one investigates. 
With the research objectives in mind, the international negotiation of the PDCA is 
the primary practice of investigation and as such, the level of aggregation as well. As 
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the process of international negotiations is conceptualized as practice, it possesses a 
context in which the various constellations of practices interact and coexist promoting 
process, change and stability. In this thesis, the various practices within this field will 
be mapped out and demarcated using the two-level game model as guidelines.   
The theoretical and methodological commitments of practice theory warrants a 
single-case research design, despite the various criticism regarding its validity and 
problem of equifinality (George and Bennett 2005 p. 54). Nevertheless, given the 
heuristic purpose of practice theory and the inclusion of a complex interpretation, a 
single-case study can promote a targeted analysis. This strategy thus aims to uncover 
the systems of meaning, causal mechanisms, and how practices cluster together form a 
socially recognized process.   
3.4 Case selection 
Since the research objectives focus on the role of the EEAS in negotiations, this puts a 
temporal constraint on the available cases. In fact, since the establishment of the EEAS, 
not many negotiations were launched having had a conclusion as well. The Political 
Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA) between The Republic of Cuba and the 
European Union fulfills these criteria. In fact, the EEAS together with the Commission 
ran point during negotiations from its beginning in 2014 till the conclusion in 2016. It 
is a case of bilateral negotiations featuring multiple issues which – in accordance with 
two-level game theory – also involves the practices of multiple interest groups with 
varying preferences and degrees of influence on the process of international 
negotiations. These qualities make it a good empirical case to explore how the EEAS 
managed inter-institutional coordination, international bargaining and EU-level interest 
group manipulation. The findings may also provide a good basis for future comparative 
studies investigating how the practices of the EEAS changed the negotiation process 
compared to previous cooperation agreements negotiated with other countries by the 
Commission. Lastly, as mentioned above, EU-Cuban relations are somewhat under-
researched which provides further validity for the findings.  
3.5 Material acquisition 
Analyzing negotiation practices is a challenging task since the availability of primary 
sources is severely limited; in addition, practice theory relies on the use of a 
combination of methods which necessitates material to be acquired from multiple 
sources. This thesis, as per above, relies on qualitative interviews and various forms of 
textual analysis to answer the research questions.  
Overall five semi-structured qualitative interviews were conducted representing 
some of the most important stakeholders of the negotiations (see Appendix). Although 
triangulation was only partially attained because of the low level of availability of 
interviewees, the most important EU negotiators were reached. The design of the 
interviews followed in line with Pouliot’s recommendations. Many of the questions 
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were referring to daily activities and actual practices during negotiations. Furthermore, 
the interview script followed the logic of the two-level game model, i.e. questions were 
asked regarding activities at Level I negotiations with Cuba as well as Level II 
interinstitutional processes. Since the primary research objective of the thesis is to 
describe the EEAS’ practices in the EU-Cuba negotiation process, the interviews were 
conducted with EEAS and EU Commission officials who were directly involved in the 
process as negotiators. For financial and logistical reasons interviews were conducted 
over the phone between November and December 2017.  
The textual material was gathered mainly from primary sources (policy drafts, 
official reports and reviews, press statements, interim agreements, final agreements and 
other official documents) as well as relevant secondary sources (academic articles, 
books, presentations, media news, and other reports). These sources were utilized along 
with the interview data to inductively interpret the process based on the concepts of 
practice and two-level game theories. 
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4 EU-Cuba PDCA Negotiations 
The Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement is the first bilateral agreement 
between the European Union and the Republic of Cuba that covers a multiplicity of 
issues ranging from political cooperation, trade and investment, and human rights all 
the way to agriculture and sustainable development (European Union and Republic of 
Cuba 2016).  
This section describes the background of EU-Cuba relations since the negotiation 
process was strongly influenced by various historical practices. Then international 
bargaining at Level I will be presented followed by discussions on each Level II 
stakeholder group in the EU. The data will be interpreted in Section 5.  
4.1 Background: the status quo of the 1996 Common 
Position  
The European Union, after failure of political rapprochement with Cuba, adopted a 
Council Common Position (CP) in 1996 which set the tone for the bilateral relations 
for the next almost two decades. The Common Position states that the “objective of the 
European Union in its relations with Cuba is to encourage a process of transition to 
pluralist democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” and that 
the EU would consider full cooperation with Cuba once it showed meaningful progress 
in these areas (Council 1996). The CP has often been described in various discourses 
on the same terms as the American embargo (Dominguez 2015 p. 178, Buck 2010 p. 
4). Bilateral relations were characterized by limited cooperation and slow progress due 
to the ‘mutual irrelevancy’ (Roy 2007 p. 10), i.e. neither side depended upon the 
collaboration.  
As outlined in the CP, human rights issues in Cuba were at the core of the bilateral 
relations in the years leading up to the negotiations. This was exemplified by the so-
called Black Spring in 2003; a social protest which ended with the imprisonment of 75 
people and the execution of 3 hijackers. In response, the European Council issued a 
strong-worded declaration limiting the scope of bilateral relations with Cuba 
(Presidency of the Council of the European Union 2003). This was also accompanied 
by a European Parliament resolution condemning the actions of the Cuban government 
(European Parliament 2003). The human rights practices of the EU sparked the issuance 
of threats and other negative feedback from the Cuba (Buck 2010). The retaliation even 
led to the scrapping of 22 aid projects from the Commission alone (European 
Parliament 2003, EEAS official 1 2017, Roy 2003).  
Real rapprochement took place in 2008 (Dominguez 2015 p. 147) when the Political 
Dialogue officially re-started between the parties (EEAS official 1 2017). This process 
was facilitated by Cuban actions such as the release of political prisoners imprisoned 
in 2003 (Franks 2011) or the implementation of political reforms. The EU also enacted 
positive changes in its discourse toward Cuba (see for example European Commission 
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2013) striving for a “constructive engagement” (Roy 2007 p. 11). Cuban officials also 
downplayed the rhetoric, e.g. calling the EU as the “lacayo” of the US (Buck 2010 p. 
11).  
In summary, bilateral relations between the EU and Cuba were characterized by a 
strong ‘tit for tat’ strategy. Axelrod’s terminology refers to a bilateral situation where 
one party only cooperates if the other one cooperates as well; however, if one party 
‘defects’ then the other one will defect as well (Axelrod 1980). At the center of this 
relationship was the practice of the 1996 CP and the human rights practices of the EU, 
tying bilateral relations to the political situation in Cuba. Any criticism from the EU’s 
side regarding Cuba’s human rights affairs resulted in retaliation and negative 
discursive practices from Cuba. Furthermore, the tit-for-tat relationship was cemented 
by the mutual irrelevancy between the EU and Cuba (Buck 2010 p. 14, EEAS official 
2 2017b). The status quo changed once Cuba’s worsening economic relations 
convinced its leadership that they cannot “put all their eggs in one basket” and the 
country needs to diversify its global partnerships (EEAS official 2 2017b). 
4.2 Pre-negotiations and the Practices of the EEAS 
The ameliorating relations from 2008 onwards led to the reconsideration of EU-Cuba 
relations. HR/VP Ashton was asked to explore the possibilities to move forward the 
relations between EU and Cuba at the 2010 Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) meeting. 
Nearly 2 years later, at the 2012 FAC meeting the HR/VP informed the Council that 
she would instruct the EEAS to draft negotiating directives for the PDCA (European 
Commission 2013). Curiously, it was the HR/VP and the EEAS that took the initiative 
despite that the “Council did not explicitly give its approval”, rather they simply “took 
[…] note of the intention of HR Ashton/EEAS” (Council of the European Union 2013a, 
b). As per the account of an EEAS official, HR/VP Ashton led the discussions in the 
Council on how to shape the bilateral relations between the EU and Cuba (EEAS 
official 2 2017b).  
The Commission’s recommendation to the Council in 2013 (European Commission 
2013) was followed by intense negotiations within the Council Working Group for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (COLAC). The pre-negotiations at the COLAC led 
to the issuance of the negotiating directives which represented a compromise between 
diverging Member State (MS) interests (EEAS official 2 2017b, Roy 2007). It was 
primarily Spain, France, and Italy that were supportive of a new policy change, while 
the Czech Republic, Poland, Sweden, and Germany wanted to see a harder stance on 
Cuba concerned about human rights issues. The primary goal for the EEAS was to 
convince the representatives of MSs that the Common Position was ineffective of 
reaching the EU’s objectives towards Cuba and in fact the European Community had 
no influence over what happened in the island (EEAS official 2 2017b). The 
Commission’s 2013 Recommendation to the Council to authorize the negotiations 
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referred to ‘coherence’ the PDCA would bring (European Commission 2013)2. The 
EEAS and the MSs reached the compromise that the Common Position would remain 
in force throughout the negotiations in addition to the “red lines” to be met (EEAS 
official 2 2017b). In sum, the EU’s human rights practices and the status quo dominated 
the internal EU-level discussions on opening the negotiations.  
As for the Cuban side, its top priority was the elimination of the CP. The Cuban 
government was at first unwilling to enter negotiations with the CP in force (EEAS 
official 2 2017b). This demand was incompatible with the Council’s demands and the 
compromise brokered by the EEAS, however, the Cuban side eventually “swallowed” 
and gave up its demand. It seems that PDCA agreement was more important for Cuba’s 
practices of diversification (EEAS official 2 2017b, Tvevad 2017, Treto 2014).  
4.3 Level I negotiations 
The PDCA negotiations comprised of seven rounds altogether, the first of which took 
place in Havana on April 29-30, 2014 (European External Action Service 2014). The 
negotiations were concluded within two years on March 11, 2016 which – despite aims 
to finish in 2015 (BBC News 2015) – was hailed as a success. The completion of the 
process within seven rounds was described as the “magic number” (EU Commission 
official 2 2017) and “quick […] compared to other [negotiations]” (EEAS official 2 
2017b).  
The negotiations concerned primarily three main areas: political dialogue, 
cooperation and sector policy-dialogue, and trade cooperation (European Union and 
Republic of Cuba 2016). The PDCA is a comprehensive agreement with numerous 
issues, including human rights and democracy, migration, social cohesion, 
development cooperation, trade, or investment. The complexity of the agreement 
necessitated large negotiating teams and the involvement of many Level II stakeholders 
with differing interests. The bargaining practices aimed at finding the right “language” 
of the actual articles in accordance with the preferences of the domestic constituencies. 
The negotiation process progressed at a slow pace in the beginning (Tvevad 2015 p. 
22). The parties needed to clarify basic concepts (EEAS official 2 2017b, EU 
Commission official 2 2017) and agree on general modalities (European External 
Action Service 2014). While the time-consuming initial efforts of getting on the same 
page would not strike anyone as a surprise, the Cuban negotiators were nonetheless 
acutely aware of what the EU’s general expectations were both in terms of essential 
content and legal requirements (EEAS official 2 2017b, EU Commission official 2 
2017). This contradiction can be explained by the initially inadequate level of trust and 
professional unfamiliarity between the negotiators. The development of trust and 
interpersonal relations were a central element of the negotiations at Level I, the effects 
                                                 
2 With some inconsistency, this number was reported to be 18, 20, and 22 according to other sources, 
see Lecartes (2014), Treto (2014), European Parliament (2017e) 
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of which correlated strongly with the faster pace of negotiations from the third round 
onwards (Tvevad 2017 p. 12).  
The practice of trust building was enacted through various official and informal 
activities. First, the negotiation rounds followed an official script which included social 
events and informal sessions as well. A round consisted of two days, each comprising 
of a morning session, business lunch, afternoon session, and a joint press point at end. 
This pattern gave ample opportunities for the negotiators to build rapport in the context 
of informal lunches, dinners, and other ad-hoc meetings. Second, the negotiating teams 
remained stable and relatively unchanged during the process which enabled trust 
building to stay uninterrupted (EEAS official 2 2017b). This was especially true for the 
representatives of the Cuban Ministry for Trade and Cooperation (MINCEX) and the 
EU Commission Directorate General for Development Cooperation (DG DEVCO) who 
had known each other prior to the negotiations thanks to the EU development aid 
projects carried out in Cuba since 2008 (EU Commission official 2 2017). One EEAS 
official also described the professional relations with the colleagues of the Embassy of 
Cuba in Brussels to be especially good, having the liberty to call the ambassador “any 
time” (EEAS official 1 2017).  
The EEAS had “sort of a leading role” during Level I bargaining on the EU’s side 
(EEAS official 2 2017b) which was represented by various activities. The chief 
negotiator was a senior EEAS official, Mr. Christian Leffler, Managing Director for the 
Americas. The EEAS presented the proposals for the Cubans and finalized the texts in 
coordination with the associated DGs. The EEAS was also responsible for taking notes 
during negotiations and including them in the subsequent proposals. The EEAS 
produced the EU’s press points at the end of every round in parallel to the Cuban 
ministry. The contents of both were agreed beforehand so that “there wouldn’t be any 
surprises” (ibid.). The EEAS was the primary contact for the Cuban side in between 
rounds as well. Simultaneously, the Commission DGs were responsible for drafting the 
texts of the articles which primarily involved highly technical work.  
The most contentious issues were related to human rights and democracy, civil 
groups, private business cooperation, and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. Some issues were easier to conclude than others. The inclusion of the 
unilateral suspension clause in case of human rights breaches was unproblematic 
because Cuba was aware of this EU requirement. However, the establishment of a 
human rights dialogue with Cuba proved to be a “trickier issue” (EEAS official 2 
2017b). The dialogue was nevertheless launched in 2015 in parallel to the negotiations 
(Tvevad 2017) which gave the EEAS (and indirectly Cuba as well) further leverage to 
be exerted at the Council in favor of ratification. The clause on disarmament and non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was another issue of time-consuming 
process since Cuba’s commitment in this regard was stricter than the EU’s, especially 
as an official signatory of the CELAC’s peace zone proclamation (CELAC 2014). 
Furthermore, EU agreements normally include the establishment of specific civil 
society committees which is not featured in the PDCA. The reasoning was that in case 
the EU followed through with this demand, it would have resulted in the Cuban 
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appointment of government sponsored NGOs, so called CONGOs, and it would have 
been counter-productive in terms of the successful conclusion of the negotiations. So 
the EEAS rather chose to “try to live with the situation” (EEAS official 2 2017b). 
Finally, Cuba requested the inclusion of a specific reference to the US embargo on 
Cuba. The EEAS’s interest manipulation within COLAC promoted compromise at both 
Levels (EEAS official 2 2017b). The EU finally accepted to “exchange views on 
coercive measures of unilateral character with extraterritorial effect” (2016 p. 20). The 
negotiators also leaned on existing international declarations of multilateral 
organizations to find mutually acceptable solutions in contentious areas. These 
challenges are underscored by the discourse of the EEAS’ press points. The parties 
identified “elements of divergence” during the third round (European External Action 
Service 2015d), the “positions were further developed and clarified” in the fourth round 
(European External Action Service 2015b), and the parties “reduced the remaining 
gaps” and “made substantial progress” in the fifth and sixth rounds (European External 
Action Service 2015a, c).  
There were also issues where the preferences of the parties overlapped. For example, 
the PDCA agreement was fundamental for both DEVCO and Cuba since it codified the 
already existing bilateral relationship in the field of development assistance. The EU 
resumed the support of Cuban development projects in 2008; therefore, the daily work 
relating to this practice informed the preferences of DEVCO regarding the PDCA. The 
EU has made available more than EUR 140m to support projects in Cuba in the areas 
of, inter alia, food security, sustainable agriculture, economic modernization, and 
climate change (European Commission 2016b). Also, the worsening economic 
situation of Cuba’s key allies, such as Venezuela and Brazil, exacerbated difficulties 
and increased Cuban dependence on EU development aid. Funds for development 
assistance are allocated within the framework of a Multiannual Indicative Program 
(MIP) for a 6 years period and implemented each year as part of an Annual Action Plan 
(European Commission 2016a). The Commission’s decision to allocate EUR 80m for 
the 2014-2020 MIP for Cuba was taken ahead of the start of the negotiations. While 
officially the two matters were not conditional upon one another, the Commission’s 
development cooperation practices asserted a positive effect on Level I bargaining (EU 
Commission official 2 2017). Consequently, the parties did not seek gain maximization, 
but rather integrated each other’s needs concerning future joint projects.  
Trade issues were perhaps even less problematic to negotiate at Level I than 
development cooperation. Cuba is not a signatory of the Cotonou Agreement, therefore 
it is not eligible to sign an Economic and Partnership Agreement with the EU which 
would allow for substantial tariff and quota reductions3. Due to its middle-income 
country status, Cuba is no longer eligible to benefit from the Generalized Scheme of 
Preferences (GSP)4 either since 2014. This only leaves the EU the Most Favored Nation 
                                                 
3 The Cotonou Agreement serves as an umbrella for African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries 
within which they are allowed to negotiate separate EPAs with the EU. 
4  The GSP allows for substantial duty reduction for economically vulnerable countries within 
bilateral trade relations with the EU. See: European Commission. 2017. Generalised Scheme of 
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(MFN) clause to be applied in its trade relations with Cuba in accordance with World 
Trade Organization (WTO) regulations. EU-Cuba trade relations are thus extensively 
regulated by WTO rules. As such, the bargaining of trade articles was relatively 
unproblematic and prompt; within three rounds the parties agreed on “virtually all 
elements” of the trade chapter (EU Commission official 1 2017, European External 
Action Service 2015d, b, a). 
The EU’s negotiating directives laid down numerous red lines which rendered the 
EU’s win-set rigid in sensitive matters. However, EU negotiators often turned this into 
a bargaining strategy to refuse concessions. During these “contextualized debates”, EU 
negotiators would lament domestic interest group concerns to increase gains: “[EU 
stakeholders] have to see their points somehow reflected, so if we have an agreement 
without reference to this […], then this won’t fly.” (EEAS official 2 2017b). This 
strategy was only used concerning issues of primary importance for the EU. In other 
cases, it was utilized only to a limited degree (EU Commission official 2 2017), or not 
at all (EU Commission official 1 2017).  
4.4 Level II processes  
4.4.1 EEAS 
As per the EU jargon, the EEAS had the mandate to lead the negotiation process, while 
DG DEVCO and DG Trade were “associated” (EU Commission official 2 2017). This 
hierarchy was highlighted several times during the various interviews. The EEAS 
coordinated the technical work of the various DGs and departments in the background 
who drafted written proposals and contra proposals of articles. Much of the work was 
done within an intra-service working group where the relevant stakeholders met on a 
regular basis to discuss operative matters. Furthermore, the EEAS regularly attended 
COLAC meetings and expert meetings at the European Parliament to report on the 
progress of negotiations (EEAS official 2 2017a, EU Commission official 1 2017, 
Council of the European Union 2015a). Approximately twelve colleagues were 
involved in the work related to the PDCA negotiations at the EEAS, many of them in 
the field of human rights; however, only one person was responsible full-time for the 
process.  
The EEAS faced challenges during coordination with the Commission. There was a 
degree of confusion about which departments should be responsible for certain tasks. 
A comprehensive agreement, such as the PDCA, involves a myriad of different 
technical details to be agreed upon which fall under the responsibilities of various DGs. 
EEAS officials put considerable efforts in achieving common understandings with their 
Commission colleagues regarding these tasks.  
The practices of the EEAS showed asymmetry in terms preferences among Level II 
EU stakeholders. While EEAS handled the PDCA negotiations as a priority, the same 
                                                 
Preferences [Online]. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
regions/development/generalised-scheme-of-preferences/ [Accessed December 23, 2017.  
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was not true for other EU departments. The decreased “sense of priority and […] 
urgency” of some key actors rendered the interinstitutional coordination challenging. 
Referring to the overall asymmetry between the EU and Cuba, one EEAS official aptly 
notes: “the EU can well do without Cuba, but can Cuba do well without the EU, that is 
a different question.” (EEAS official 2 2017b). This general sentiment was reflected in 
the difficulty of getting key stakeholders invested in the process and obtaining results 
as per the expectations of the EEAS. Consequently, the EEAS focused on generating 
momentum with regards to reluctant departments. This was, for example, apparent in 
the area of migration, where DG Home was hesitant to invest resources in the PDCA 
agreement while they had to deal with the “waves of immigrants flooding into Europe” 
(EEAS official 1 2017). Trade was another field where EEAS had to generate 
momentum due to the low issue salience of trade matters in the PDCA agreement 
(EEAS official 1 2017, EEAS official 2 2017b), as well as for Cuba (EU Commission 
official 1 2017).  
In order to generate momentum, officials from the EEAS explained the importance 
of the agreement to other EU actors, the advantages of EU-Cuba bilateral cooperation, 
and the realistic workload the involved departments should expect from its 
implementation. Apart from attempting to achieve a shared understanding among key 
players, EEAS officials occasionally made specific references to the hierarchy as well, 
i.e. to the mandate and authority of the HR/VP. In cases of more reluctant departments, 
officials involved higher-level decision makers to generate momentum, although 
acquiescence was largely achieved at an operative level (EU Commission official 2 
2017).  
4.4.2 Council (COLAC) 
The Council of the European Union was another key player at Level II during 
negotiations due to the explicit rules governing the negotiation of international 
agreements, especially in the field of CFSP. In cases of international agreements with 
non-EU countries featuring shared competencies, the official rules of ratification in the 
EU dictate that the Council approves the final agreement based on common accord after 
which it is consented by the EP (Council of the European Union 2017c). The Council 
was thus the most important actor in terms of ratifying the agreement negotiated at 
Level I with Cuba.  
The EU’s negotiating team had to continuously ensure that the interests of MSs were 
met within COLAC which is a specialized working party set up by the COREPER and 
chaired by the representative of the HR/VP (Council of the European Union 2017a). 
EEAS officials attended all Council meetings (unlike DG DEVCO or Trade) which 
took place once before and after every negotiation round. The activities within COLAC 
focused on finding compromises among the more critical MSs, i.e. the Czech Republic, 
Poland, Germany, and Sweden. The EEAS also communicated the demands of Cuba 
and reported on the progress achieved at Level I bargaining. The EEAS managed to 
influence hardliner MS representatives thanks to the human rights dialogue launched 
in parallel to the negotiations led by the EU Special Representative for Human Rights 
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(Tvevad 2015, EEAS official 2 2017b). Within the framework of the human rights 
dialogue, additional Council meetings were held before and after each session (EEAS 
official 2 2017b). Virtually all matters of substance were agreed within COLAC: the 
debates never actually reached ministerial, or even Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (COREPER) level (EEAS official 2 2017a). Only occasional reports 
were sent to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) (EEAS official 2 2017a) 
(Council of the European Union 2017b).  
The effectiveness of the interinstitutional coordination at working party level was 
primarily enabled by two main factors. First, the EEAS and the EU negotiating team 
achieved the most important mandates of the negotiating directives at Level I (EEAS 
official 2 2017b) which, as noted above, depended strongly on the willingness of Cuba 
to compromise. The negotiation directives provided strict instructions which facilitated 
the preemption of roadblocks at Council. Second, COLAC is a working party which 
meets at the level of capital representatives, usually at Director level, as well as 
decision-makers from the Brussels Permanent Representation. Consequently, it 
possesses high level of political authority to make decisions (EEAS official 2 2017a). 
As a result, the decision on the conclusion of the PDCA was effectively passed without 
discussion on all levels: as “I-point” within COREPER (EEAS official 2 2017a) and as 
an item “A” during the 3506th meeting of the Economic and Financial Committee 
(Council of the European Union 2016a, e). The 1996 Common Position was 
simultaneously repealed by the Council (Council of the European Union 2016d). This 
decision had signaled commitment toward Cuba considering that the PDCA only 
entered into force (provisionally) months later after the EP’s consent.  
In accordance with the decision of the Council, the President of the European 
Council (PEC) designates the signatory of the agreement (Council of the European 
Union 2016c). The HR/VP was appointed on behalf of the EU to sign the agreement. 
The agreement was concluded and initialed in Havana in the presence the 
Commissioner for DG DEVCO on March 11, 2016 (European Commission and EEAS 
2016). Following the Council’s decision on the conclusion and provisional application 
of the PDCA (Council of the European Union 2016b), the agreement was officially 
signed in Brussels on December 12, 2016 by the HR/VP and the foreign ministers of 
the EU 28 MSs on behalf of the EU. The event was scheduled right before the last FAC 
meeting of the year (Council of the European Union 2016f). While these factors may 
signal the commitment of the HR/VP with regards to the PDCA negotiations; the 
issue’s salience was nonetheless cast in a contrasting light by the fact neither the 
ceremonial signing of the PDCA nor EU-Cuba relations were mentioned during the 
press conference following the FAC meeting (European External Action Service 2016).  
4.4.3 Commission 
The European Commission was a key stakeholder at both Levels. Officially DG 
DEVCO and DG Trade were associated and both delegated representatives to the EU 
negotiating team. These officials were responsible for conducting the bilateral 
negotiations on chapters and articles that pertained to their respective fields.   
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Interestingly, DG DEVCO did not have a clear strategy ahead of the negotiations 
despite its strong preferences. The objective was simply to conclude the agreement to 
ensure the ongoing development and cooperation projects in Cuba. The majority of the 
work within DEVCO was overwhelmingly technical (EU Commission official 2 2017). 
Although this area was of primary importance for both the Commission as well as Cuba, 
it nevertheless had relatively low political salience which did not require elaborate 
strategies to pursue.  
The work of DG Trade was similar to DEVCO. Only one person was responsible 
for negotiating the trade chapters at Level I and for coordinating the technical work of 
fifteen colleagues within the DG Trade. The trade chapters of the PDCA did not result 
in any market opening, therefore, the negotiations had low strategic importance for DG 
Trade. This explains the efforts of the EEAS to generate momentum (EU Commission 
official 1 2017, European External Action Service 2015d, b, a) and why DG Trade took 
the initiative to recommend texts ahead of negotiations. Level II ratification on trade-
related issues of the PDCA were handled without considerable roadblocks both at the 
COLAC and at the EP (EU Commission official 1 2017). 
As mentioned above, one of the main challenges of the work with the Commission 
was to clear up the confusion on the responsibilities of the various DGs during 
negotiations. The range of technical issues needed the involvement of numerous 
departments and since Cuba is not a strategic country for most fields, there was a degree 
of resistance from these constituencies to prioritize related tasks. The EEAS thus 
needed to assign responsibility, advocate the matter, and secure the active involvement 
of the departments. 
4.4.4 Civil Groups 
Perhaps one of the most unique Level II interest groups were civil societies possessing 
strong preferences in the fields of human rights and democracy. For decades, the central 
point of EU-Cuba relations were human rights issues and the situation of Cuban 
political opponents and dissidents, it is no wonder then why the most socially 
recognizable aspects of the PDCA negotiations were human rights, democracy and the 
rule of law.  
The EEAS faced impediments in coordinating and influencing civil societies. There 
were two main groups: one vehemently opposed any agreement between the EU and 
Cuba until certain fundamental reforms were put in place in the Cuban political system; 
the other was relatively supportive of the process. However, the practices of these two 
groups showed asymmetry. Civil societies critical of the PDCA – the “hardline kind” 
– were considerably more active during negotiations, especially in their lobby efforts 
towards the EP (EEAS official 1 2017). Prominent Cuban opposition members – 
including Guillermo Farinas, the Ladies in White, and the Cuban Committee for Human 
Rights and National Reconciliation – argue that the Cuban government and its 
oppression of political opposition and fundamental democratic rights is legitimized by 
the PDCA (Tvevad 2017 pp. 20-21). Furthermore, it is argued from a civil rights 
perspective that the Cuban government will not abide by the articles of the PDCA 
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referring to the increase in political repression right after the conclusion of the 
agreement (Civil Rights Defenders 2016). These lines of arguments were in opposition 
with the preferences of the EEAS and MSs to assert positive influence on Cuba though 
the PDCA.   
The EEAS kept an open line of communication with the most important civil groups, 
both critical and supportive. Nevertheless, these practices on the EEAS’ part could not 
enter a more institutionalized platform during negotiations as it would have hurt the 
Cuban government’s preferences and willingness to negotiate. Due to this and the 
opposing interests between the EEAS and hardliner civil groups, virtually no overlap 
was found in their approaches (EEAS official 1 2017). On the other hand, interaction 
with these groups provided EEAS with an alternate source of information to red flag 
problems and bring certain issues on-board with the Cubans.  
The representatives of 37 civil rights groups wrote an open letter to Federica 
Mogherini asking the EU to condition the agreement’s ratification upon certain steps, 
including “the exercise by Cuba’s citizens of their right to choose a democratic and 
pluralistic system of government and to hold free elections.” (Cuban democratic 
oppostion groups 2016). Many critical human rights advocates and civil society groups 
were regular invitees in the EP for conferences and meetings which granted critical 
perspective a higher political and social visibility. On occasion, however, EEAS 
officials did manage to convince representatives of critical democratic groups of the 
PDCA’s advantages, especially during conversations about the situation of trade 
unionists. Nonetheless, real rapprochement of opinions did not occur between the 
EEAS and critical civil society groups (EEAS official 1 2017).  
4.4.5 European Parliament 
Even though the CFSP is a field of shared competence between the EU and MSs and 
international agreements are decided upon by the EU Council as well as the 
representatives of governments based on common accord5, the European Parliament 
nevertheless played a crucial part in the ratification process of the PDCA. First, MEPs 
regularly submitted so-called Written Questions to the Council regarding the state of 
affairs between the EU and Cuba with special regards to human rights and democracy. 
Second, the EU’s Chief Negotiator and other EEAS senior officials regularly updated 
the EP’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) regarding outstanding issues (Council 
of the European Union 2015a p. 283). Third, the EP has awarded its Sakharov Prize for 
Freedom of Thought to Cuban opposition figures on three separate occasions: to 
Oswaldo José Payá in 2002, to the Ladies in White in 2005, and to Guillermo Farinas 
in 2010. Finally, the EP needed to approve the agreement in accordance with the 
consent procedure (Council of the European Union 2017d) which made the provisional 
                                                 
5 Although officially the ‘common accord’ does not constitute an official voting rule according to the 
TFEU, it nevertheless governs decision making in cases of international agreements of shared 
competence. See for more details: General Secretariat of the Council, 2016. Comments on the Council's 
Rules of Procedure, European Council's and Council's Rules of Procedure Luxembourg: Doc. no.: QC-
04-15-692-EN-N  
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application of the agreement conditional upon consent as well (Council of the European 
Union 2016c, European Parliament 2017d p. 17). The EP approved the PDCA on July 
5, 2017 and provisional application subsequently commenced on November 1 
(European External Action Service 2017, European Parliament 2017a). The full 
implementation of the PDCA requires the ratification of national parliaments of the 
MSs as well.  
In rare cases, the EP issues a non-legislative resolution to communicate a political 
opinion as part of ratification. After debates at the EP intensified, it became clear that 
a non-legislative resolution will be adopted. The EEAS put in “a lot of legwork” at 
various EP committees to influence the outcome of the vote and the wording of the 
resolution. Even though only a small group of MEPs were actively interested in the 
PDCA, they nevertheless exerted strong influence in committee meetings. The group’s 
invested interests translated into an increased influence throughout the process.  
The officials of the EEAS, DG Trade, and DG DEVCO had regular meetings with 
various EP committees to work out the necessary compromises in cooperation with the 
rapporteur, Elena Valenciano. The senior colleagues from the EEAS undertook the role 
of first reader at AFET, while DEVCO was first reader at committee meetings 
concerning the development cooperation matters. Along with civil societies, the Cuban 
government also heavily lobbied EP stakeholders to influence the outcome. The 
colleagues of the EEAS were in daily contact with the Cuban Embassy in Brussels to 
cooperate during this process (EEAS official 1 2017). A compromise resolution was 
adopted at AFET (European Parliament 2017c) after intense negotiations stretching 
into the night. However, in an unusual turn of events, some parts of the resolution were 
changed in the last minute during the plenary session on July 5, 2017. This signals the 
active manipulation of core stakeholders within the EP in the last two weeks leading up 
to the final vote (European Parliament 2017b, EEAS official 2 2017b). The final 
resolution contained several crucial modifications that strengthened the critical tone of 
the document. For example, it eliminated point ‘X’ from the draft referring to the 
positive role Cuba played in the FARC peace process in Colombia (European 
Parliament 2017d) and toned down the explicit references to the negative effects of the 
US embargo and the extraterritorial effects of the Helms-Burton Act (European 
Parliament 2017b). Additional extensions of the final version refer to, inter alia, the 
“arbitrary politically motivated detentions in Cuba” and to the “more and more 
crackdowns”.  
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5 Widening the Scope: Practices and Two-
Level Games  
In accordance with the methodological framework, this section provides interpretation 
and generalization of the findings based on the concepts of practice and two-level game 
theories. The negotiation of the PDCA is a shared practice which is best described 
through the interpretation of the constellation of practices within its context at both 
levels.  
The first sub-section will demarcate the most important practices according to 
whether they are performed at Level I or at Level II. Each of these practices fulfill the 
core concepts of practice theory: they are intersubjective, processive, discursive, 
socially relevant, and contextual. The second sub-section provides further 
interpretation and generalization from a two-level game perspective. 
5.1 Demarcating Practices 
5.1.1 Practices at Level I 
Bargaining was the most important observable practice at Level I comprising various 
activities including, inter alia, the identification of issues, communication of 
preferences, exchanges of texts, finding the right ‘language’, using various bargaining 
strategies, holding press conferences, or making concessions. This practice features all 
core practice concepts. It was patterned over rounds, it was clearly discursive in 
multiple ways, it comprised of a constellation of other practices, and its social relevance 
was paramount as well. However, from a theoretical perspective, the bargaining 
practice was most fundamentally influenced by its shared practical intelligibility. The 
Cuban negotiators were highly familiar with the mandatory EU processes and legal 
requirements.  They were consequently willing to make concessions and find the 
necessary overlaps facilitating the conclusion of the negotiations within two years. The 
EU negotiators also had intersubjective knowledge of the Cuban political system, the 
government’s expectations in more sensitive matters and what would be productive or 
counter-productive in terms of bargaining strategies. The parties were, to a high extent, 
on the same page as to what can be expected from the negotiations and what both side’s 
expectations were from the very beginning. The shared background knowledge of the 
parties, i.e. their intersubjectivity, contributed to a strong sense of practical 
intelligibility on both sides. The shared political, social, and cultural meanings 
permitted the negotiators to act in a way that made sense and geared negotiations toward 
a mutually acceptable agreement rather than towards a breakdown.  
Trust building was another important practice facilitating bargaining at Level I. Both 
parties effectuated the practice through informal meetings, lunches, dinners, receptions 
etc., although the EEAS can be considered as a primary initiator, especially in Brussels. 
The practice of trust building was crucial both because of its patterned nature as well 
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as its social relevance. Recall that practices are socially recognizable and as processes, 
their recognition and impact influences the evolution of practices over time, i.e. 
practices possess a t+1 value. Historically, EU-Cuba relations were characterized by 
strong fluctuation, tit-for-tat strategies, and underlying all that, mistrust. While the 
official communiqués and rhetorics may not have translated themselves into informal 
discursive practices with the same ferocity, the tit-for-tat practices of Cuba and the EU 
certainly did not promote an atmosphere where parties could initiate the PDCA 
negotiations having an ideal level of professional and interpersonal trust (which 
demonstrates the effects of this practice on the PDCA negotiations through social 
recognition). The trust-building practices of the EEAS were therefore essential, 
especially in the beginning. As a process, it induced change over time and promoted 
the more effective execution of bargaining practices.  
The third observable practice at Level I was the practice of a human rights dialogue; 
albeit it is rather specific to the PDCA negotiations. While strictly speaking the human 
rights dialogue was exogenous to the negotiations, it was nevertheless crucial for the 
successful conclusion of the negotiations, especially in terms of context of the 
ratification and the interest manipulation practices within the EU (e.g. the EP 
specifically welcomes and mentions this practice in its non-legislative resolution). The 
social recognition and relevance of this practice derived from historical EU-Cuba 
relations. The human rights issues have always been at the center of EU policies toward 
Cuba which are socially recognized to a high degree; therefore, it was crucial for the 
EU to ensure coherence in this matter. The practice of the human rights dialogue 
communicates these preferences and adds to the social relevance and recognition of the 
PDCA negotiation as well.  
5.1.2 Practices at Level II 
The practice of ratification, i.e. the approval of the agreement either formally or 
informally at Level II, was patterned over time and should be considered as a dynamic 
process. Practices induce change during negotiations, even if it is as swiftly concluded 
as the PDCA. As one EEAS official put it referring to the objectives outlined in the 
negotiating directives: “we didn’t get everything we wanted”. Consequently, the 
regular meetings at COLAC not only kept all stakeholders informed but also many of 
the concessions negotiated at this forum resulted in the constant adjustment of the EU’s 
win-set and what would be ratifiable at the end. The patterned and processive elements 
of the ratification practice thus explain why the agreement was passed as an ‘A’ item 
at Council level (i.e. without discussion): every detail of the PDCA had already been 
agreed upon within COLAC. Second, the practice of ratification also features strong 
contextuality. Ratification constantly informed the practices of the negotiators at Level 
I and vice-versa, the practices at Level I influenced the ratification process and the 
concessions given within its context at Level II. In addition, the practice of ratification 
also governed the implementation of other Level II practices. The coordination and 
interest group manipulation practices of the EEAS were constantly informed by 
ratification. The intersubjective understanding of ratification ensured the practical 
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intelligibility of these practices. Finally, the social recognition of ratification was also 
apparent during the PDCA negotiation. The adoption of the non-legislative resolution 
adopted with unforeseen last-minute modifications carried a real risk of constraining 
the agreement’s implementation and the cooperation with Cuba. That is because such 
a political message carries social relevance and recognition which is why substantial 
preference manipulation practices took place at the EP. 
Many elements of the practice of interest group manipulation were observable 
during the PDCA negotiations. According to Putnam, the statesmen at Level II aim to 
manipulate stakeholder preferences in order to facilitate the arrangement of win-sets 
and the ratification practice. The PDCA negotiations showed for example that the 
EEAS concentrated its manipulation practice on the most crucial interest groups, i.e. 
the COLAC, the associate DGs, the EP, and civil society groups. The EEAS aimed at 
expanding intersubjectivity between groups to promote their practical intelligibility in 
favor of its own interests. This was demonstrated by various EEAS activities such as 
convincing MSs representatives of the advantages of starting negotiations with Cuba. 
The EEAS also sought to generate momentum at reluctant DGs by explaining to 
Commission constituencies what gains might be expected from better bilateral relations 
with Cuba, e.g. its highly sophisticated medical sector. The EEAS and the associated 
DGs (Trade and DEVCO) exerted efforts at the EP to manipulate preferences so that 
the ratification of the PDCA would be practically intelligible for all decision-makers. 
Furthermore, manipulation practices were patterned over time and space which is 
crucial in terms of effectuating changes in intersubjective preferences of stakeholders. 
The high variety of issues covered by the PDCA necessitated the constant 
interinstitutional coordination by the EEAS throughout the course of the negotiations. 
This practice was a key factor in achieving progress and commitment within the EU 
which highlights the importance of contextuality as a core concept. Recall that practices 
happen in a constellation of other practices, rules, and various artifacts through which 
they coexist. The regular preparatory meetings with the members of the negotiating 
team, the COLAC meetings held before and after each negotiating round, or the 
committee briefings and other forms of communication with the members of the EP all 
constituted elements of the coordination practice. In addition, inter-institutional 
coordination was governed by explicit rules, such as the appointment of the HR/VP to 
lead the negotiations providing the EEAS with the authority to coordinate. The 
coordination practice was part of a larger context of closely intertwined practices at 
both levels, including interest group manipulation and Level I bargaining. The 
momentum generation at the Commission is a good example of the overlapping 
contexts of practices, namely interest manipulation and interinstitutional coordination.  
5.1.3 Context-relevant Practices 
The practice of international negotiation also happens in a context in which the causal 
effects of other practices and external events should not be excluded. Without 
accounting for these practices, the practice of international negotiation would be taken 
out of context and it would render the underlying practical intelligibility 
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incomprehensible. There were several exogenous practices which were essential 
elements in the context of the PDCA negotiations, many of those described in detail in 
the sub-section 4.1 on the background of the negotiations.  
The 1996 Common Position that defined the bilateral relations between Cuba and 
the EU was probably the most considerable causal element in the context of the PDCA 
negotiations. The CP should be understood as a practice insofar that 1) it was patterned 
as it influenced the external affairs of both Cuba and the EU for many years, it was also 
annually evaluated; 2) it defined practical intelligibility shared among the MSs of the 
EU in their policies vis-á-vis Cuba; 3) it possessed discursive elements resulting in 
common usage of the language of the CP in subsequent activities and instigated 
recognizable discursive practices from Cuba (referencing to the CP as a “sanction” 
similar to the US embargo); 4) it had considerable social relevance especially in light 
of the situation of the political opposition and human rights affairs in Cuba; 5) and 
finally it also determined the context of EU external practices toward the Island as well 
as the status quo leading up to the PDCA negotiations. This status-quo practice and 
especially its context induced, inter alia, the tit-for-tat relationship between the parties 
with the EU’s human rights practices at its center. 
Reference was made to the EU’s human rights practice in its relations with Cuba. 
Again, this practice was patterned over time including regular actions such as the 
issuance of the 2003 Presidency declaration condemning the Cuban government with 
regards to the Black Spring, the interaction of the EU delegation with civil society 
groups in Cuba, or the EU’s annual human rights reports evaluating Cuban human 
rights situation among other countries (see for example Council of the European Union 
2013c, 2014, 2015b). The human rights practices are of course highly discursive as 
well, the usage of certain terminology often possesses sensitivity and a few words can 
greatly alter the evolution of bilateral relations.6 These practices were highly relevant 
in the context of launching the human rights dialogue as well as the bargaining of the 
political dialogue articles of the PDCA at Level I. 
Additionally, the EU’s practice of development cooperation in Cuba was also an 
important factor for the PDCA negotiations. As described above in detail, the 
development aid resumed in 2008 as part of the rapprochement between the EU and 
Cuba. These projects provided considerable financial support for the Cuban economy 
and society which generated not only social recognition but also contributed to a shared 
practical intelligibility between the EU (especially DG DEVCO as a core interest 
group) and Cuba. This practice thus rendered the decision to codify this relationship 
both sensible and significant. The decision on the allocation of EUR 80m of 
development aid to Cuba for the 2014-2020 MIP also mattered in the context of the 
negotiation of the development and cooperation articles since both parties knew that 
the various elements of the agreement would be funded for the foreseeable future.  
                                                 
6 Let us just think about the discursive elements of the 2003 Presidency Declaration on the Black 
Spring which resulted in the freezing of bilateral relations for 5 years. A rather astonishing feat resulting 
from a 1 page document!  
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Finally, individual MS bilateral practices vis-á-vis Cuba should be mentioned, 
especially since many scholars adjust the multi-level game theory to three levels in EU 
negotiations research. Although a three-level model would have proved redundant in 
case of this analysis (MSs level coordination, i.e. Level III, took place to a high degree 
within COLAC), MSs practices should nevertheless be accounted for, especially in 
terms of trade and investment. While the practice of the CP made EU-Cuba relations 
conditional upon human rights issues, it did not prohibit most MSs from forming 
bilateral relations with Cuba primarily to regulate trade and investment relations. 
Therefore, the external relations and practices of MSs running parallel to the EU 
negotiations are important contextual elements of practice of international negotiation, 
with Spain-Cuba relations being the most obvious example.
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SIMPLISTIC DIAGRAM ON THE CONSTELLATION OF PRACTICES OF THE PDCA NEGOTIATIONS 
 
Level II 
Practices 
•Ratification 
• Interest manipulation 
• Inter-institutional 
coordination 
 
Level I 
Practices 
•Bargaining 
•Trust-building 
•Human rights dialogue 
 
 
Context-relevant practices 
 
•1996 Common Position 
•Pre-negotiation practice 
•EU human rights practices 
•EU development cooperation in Cuba 
•Bilateral Member State relations with 
Cuba 
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5.2 Interpretation through the Two-level Game Model 
After having located and elaborated the various practices of the PDCA negotiations, 
the question arises: how can we interpret the practice-based findings in relation to the 
game level model? The following sub-sections aim to complement the previous 
theoretical discussions on the intersection of practice theory and the two-level game 
model both in terms of testing assumptions of the latter as well as providing new 
insights based on the former. Recall that according to Putnam’s argument win-set is 
determined by three factors: Level I strategies, Level II institutions and Level II 
preferences and coalitions. Before discussing each point, I will also touch upon the 
basic distinction of levels from a practice perspective. 
5.2.1 Expository levels and practices 
It was noted before that the levels of the two-level game model provide an expository 
tool to analyze negotiations. The dynamic interaction between levels during the PDCA 
negotiations was enacted by the performance of practices. The coordination practices 
of the EEAS, for example, allowed for the constant adjustment of interest group 
preferences at Level II as well as bargaining strategies at Level I. Moreover, the 
practices of the EEAS, as chief negotiator, strengthened the shared intersubjectivity 
among Level II stakeholders as well as at Level I with regards to Cuba. This is 
demonstrated by, inter alia, the bargaining practices at Level I with the purpose of 
clarifying preferences and explaining the EU’s core positions. These practices, 
therefore, helped to share the subjective perspectives behind EU interests. At the same 
time, the EEAS also communicated and represented Cuban interests at COLAC by 
transferring the intersubjectivity acquired through negotiations. Only by understanding 
the positions of the Cuban side was it practically intelligible to make concessions and 
approach the Cuban win-sets. These examples demonstrate that practices happen 
consecutively and simultaneously through and across levels. 
While the levels provide a good expository tool to analyze negotiations, it 
nevertheless limits the scope of relevant practices. A practice-based approach 
highlights the importance of contextuality and the interrelation of practices. The 
analysis of the PDCA negotiations would lack coherence if the various contextual 
factors or historical background were excluded from consideration. This includes 
exogenous events as well as independent practices that influence the negotiation 
process. An obvious example for the latter would be the practice of embargo by the US 
towards Cuba. Two-level game theory should, therefore, include historical background 
and focus on the processive and contextual qualities of practices. In addition, in the 
EU’s case, the pre-negotiation of negotiating directives is an important phase which is 
difficult to fit into the current distinction of Levels. Level I and II practices are difficult 
to grasp unless one has a clear understanding of the t+1 effects of the pre-negotiation 
practice and how it influences practitioners’ intelligibility. Taking another example, the 
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EU’s human rights practices toward Cuba constituted an influencing factor regarding 
Level II EU practices as well as Level I bargaining strategies.  
5.2.2 Level I strategies and practices 
According to Putnam, the first determinant of win-sets is Level I strategies. Two-level 
game theory hypothesizes that parties seek gain maximization at Level I and that the 
domestic win-set size determines the gains achieved. This approach consequently 
presumes the abundance of confrontational or distributive style negotiations. However, 
a practice approach underlined that many of the practices aimed at reaching solutions 
that would benefit both parties while adhering to the necessary red lines. Practical 
intelligibility is key here. EU negotiators knew that “talking tough and leaving the 
table” would have had counterproductive results with the Cubans (EEAS official 2 
2017b). This intersubjective knowledge informed the practical intelligibility of the 
bargaining practice at Level I to emphasize cooperation and joint problem-solving of 
outstanding matters. On the other hand, certain activities underscored two-level game’s 
zero-sum supposition. Parties utilized confrontational bargaining strategies in issues of 
political sensitivity. Negotiators indeed refused certain concessions referring to the 
complex stakeholder interests which also highlights the discursive elements of the 
bargaining practice.  
Following the above logic, two-level game theory argues that the asymmetric sizes 
of the parties’ win-sets provide negotiating advantage at Level I. Constrained win-set 
provides negotiating advantage while a large win-set will force negotiators to make 
more concessions. An asymmetric balance between the parties’ win-sets was certainly 
observable in the case of the PDCA negotiations in favor of the EU. However, does this 
asymmetric power balance promote uneven distribution of gains and use of 
confrontational bargaining at Level I? A practice approach suggests that many elements 
can influence Level I and asymmetry might not always manifests itself during 
negotiations. Bargaining is influenced by a constellation of other practices, social 
relevance, and discourses which all formulate practical intelligibility. In the case of the 
PDCA, the asymmetry between the parties was visible only to a limited degree because 
it did not make sense for the EU to constantly pursue gain maximization. The social 
relevance of failed negotiations with Cuba would have been simply worse. 
Trust building was a crucial element in the context of the PDCA negotiation practice 
which is most likely an important element during any international negotiation process. 
Its relevance might be increased when the EU negotiates agreements with third parties 
with which bilateral relations have been plagued by conflicts and normative 
differences. The effectiveness of trust building practices might also be influenced by 
the cost of no-agreement, the power balance (i.e. symmetrical or asymmetrical 
negotiations) as well as the state of the status quo (i.e. the possibility for hurting 
stalemate) between the parties. The discursive and patterned nature of trust building 
practices can inherently influence the negotiation process.  
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5.2.3 Level II preferences and practices 
Level II preferences constitute the second main determinant of win-set sizes. Two-level 
game theory bases its rational choice calculations on the cost of no-agreement. In terms 
of the PDCA negotiations, the fundamental choice was between maintaining the status 
quo determined by the practice of the 1996 CP or negotiating an agreement. Therefore, 
the cost of no-agreement was especially relevant since no other alternatives were on the 
table for either side. In this regard as well, the EU’s was arguably in a better position 
than Cuba. Consequently, the CP and the status quo between EU and Cuba was a safety 
net for the EU. On the other hand, Cuba’s preferences both before and during the 
negotiations primarily were the withdrawal of the CP. The cost of no-agreement should 
be understood in light of the contexts and changes induced by practices. The effects of 
exogenous practices, for example, can influence the practical intelligibility of the 
negotiations. In the case of the PDCA, the changing economic practices between Cuba 
and its allies changed the intersubjectivity of the PDCA with the EU and facilitated the 
launch of negotiations.  
Two-level game theory assumes that interests differ between the principal and agent, 
i.e. the chief negotiator and domestic constituencies. The practices of the EEAS during 
PDCA negotiations only underscores this assumption to a very limited degree. The 
EEAS was highly interested in concluding the negotiations and performed its practices 
accordingly at Level II. However, looking through the lens of practice theory, it was 
also clear that this dichotomy might not do justice in cases of complex multi-issue 
negotiations. The interest group manipulation practices of the EEAS incorporated the 
interests of all stakeholders to various degrees without jeopardizing the negotiation. 
Moreover, many of the interests communicated through practices were not in conflict 
with other stakeholders, even at Level I, as two-level game theory would primarily 
assume.  
The practices at Level II demonstrated clearly the challenges of heterogeneous 
interests among interest groups and reinforces the assumptions of two-level game 
theory. First, stakeholders who have special interest in the agreement (or no-agreement) 
exert special influence on the negotiation process (Putnam 1988 p. 445). This was 
clearly underscored by the activity of highly concerned civil society groups or certain 
MEPs with special interests in EU-Cuba relations. On the other hand, the coordination 
practices of the EEAS also demonstrated that the lack of interest of certain essential 
groups, such as various DGs, may also constitute a challenge and affect win-set size as 
well as Level I bargaining. The practical intelligibility explains the connection between 
the level of influence and interest. Groups who have nothing to gain from an agreement, 
it won’t make sense for them to perform certain practices. Interest groups who have 
much to lose from the agreement, however, will aim to exert influence via practices 
because it is intelligible for them to do so. Therefore, Level II preferences and their 
influence on win-set sizes could be better understood through practices since they carry 
meaning and social recognition.  
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Furthermore, since Level II preferences are represented through practices, the 
interrelation between the activities of the stakeholder renders win-set formulation a 
dynamic concept. Issue salience and the correlating levels of interest can fluctuate 
temporally which would be reflected by practices and the cost-benefit calculations of 
actors at any given time. The importance of certain matters would remain relatively 
constant over time for some stakeholders, while other issues may become less or more 
salient relative to matters of importance to a given stakeholder. It is not difficult to 
understand why DG Home would not devote human resources to the EU-Cuba 
negotiations when other exogenous events, i.e. the refugee crisis in the EU, require 
more immediate attention. From a practice point of view, issue salience and level of 
interest is represented via practices in which the concept of practical intelligibility is 
crucial. It simply did not make sense for DG Home to make the EU-Cuba negotiations 
a matter of priority. Furthermore, exogenous practices stemming from the negotiations 
may also serve as a factor in changing domestic stakeholder group interests. A clear 
example was the human rights dialogue launched jointly by the EU and Cuba as a direct 
result of the negotiations. 
The practices of Level II interest groups also shed light on the multiplicity of win-
sets. Two-level game theory generally conceives win-set as an aggregate concept for 
each party. However, win-sets may be considered as simultaneously multiple for each 
party, especially in the case of comprehensive multi-issue agreements. The practices of 
the various stakeholders during the PDCA negotiations, such as DG DEVCO, Trade, 
or the EEAS, illustrated that each issue had its own win-set correlating with the 
involved interest group’s level of influence. The extant practices of DG DEVCO in 
Cuba, for example, made the negotiations of the development and cooperation chapters 
relatively unproblematic, i.e. the win-sets of the parties were clearly overlapping in this 
issue. At the same time, the political and human rights chapters negotiated by the EEAS 
proved to be considerably more difficult to agree on due to the issue’s high salience 
and the involvement of multiple interest groups. In sum, practices differ depending on 
the context and the issue salience which results in having multiple win-sets during the 
negotiation of multi-issue agreements. In-depth analysis of practices can contribute to 
a better understanding on the effects of issue salience and the interrelation between 
issues (e.g. side deals across issues). 
Practices are capable of limiting the fluctuation of win-sets. From the EU’s point of 
view, the issuance of negotiating directives does set a rigid framework for the 
ratification process even if it does not set preferences in stone. Even during the pre-
negotiations phase of the PDCA, the EEAS exerted efforts into shaping the formulation 
of directives which would allow for overlapping win-sets with Cuba. However, interest 
manipulation practices diverged from the guidelines of the directives due to the context 
of Level I bargaining. After the first few rounds of the negotiations, the Cuban side put 
forward unexpected demands regarding issues which required divergence from the 
established preferences. The practices of the other negotiating party at Level I can, 
therefore, induce change and serve as a context for the chief negotiator’s interest 
manipulation practices of its own domestic constituencies at Level II. This would 
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indeed highlight an alternative approach to the analysis of Level II preferences and 
correlating win-set sizes. 
5.2.4 Level II institutions and practices 
Finally, two-level game theory argues that win-set size is determined by the ratification 
at Level II, especially the explicit voting rules required for approval. The more 
complicated the process of approval and the more autonomy the various institutions 
possess the more constrained will be the win-set of that party. Conversely, if a state is 
highly autonomous where institutions only have limited influence in the final approval 
of the agreement will have an increased win-set since it won’t be able to refer to 
domestic constraints of ratification during Level I negotiations.  
Again, the practices of EU and Cuba in the PDCA negotiations show some 
discrepancies to these assumptions. On the one hand, EU negotiators did not see any 
risk for the agreement not to be ratified by Cuba. While this would mean that Cuba’s 
win-set was inflated, I would argue that this correlation is problematic to underscore 
because institutional autonomy is also difficult to measure, not to mention win-sets. 
Practices, however, are based on shared intelligibility which means that bargaining 
practices at Level I would communicate issues of interest and the boundaries of win-
sets. Even though ratification by a parliament with limited authority would most likely 
go through because of the government’s influence in the political system. Nonetheless, 
that country would still have its interests and red lines determining the issue-related 
win-sets.  
In case of the EU, the above assumption is easier to underscore. It is often argued 
that the EU is a tough negotiating partner because the time-consuming process of 
issuing the negotiating directives which often represents the lowest common 
denominator, i.e. the viewpoint of the most reluctant MSs at the Council of the issue at 
hand (Elgström and Strömvik 2005, Elgström 2005, Larsén 2007). The EU negotiation 
directives, the anonymous voting rules in Council, the EP’s consent and the lobby 
power of various stakeholders throughout the process makes the practice of ratification 
a more difficult issue in the complex institutional system of the EU. This was also 
reflected in Level I bargaining in the case of the PDCA. However, the practice analysis 
of ratification also showed that construing it as a continuous process involves also the 
consideration of contexts, discourses, and social relevance in understanding the 
fluctuating interests behind approval. The practices of the EEAS, for example, made 
the ratification process of the PDCA more predictable and less constraining on the EU’s 
win-set.  
Furthermore, I argue that the pre-negotiations phase of the PDCA, i.e. the process 
leading up to the issuance of negotiation directives should in fact be considered as part 
of the ratification practice and therefore of the two-level game model as well. The core 
concept of processivity dictates ratification represents evolving preferences influenced 
by a context of other practices, such as pre-negotiations. These practices result in the 
EU negotiating directives which provided the frame for Level I bargaining and limit 
the manipulation practices at Council.  
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6 Conclusions 
The research objectives of this thesis were formulated in a threefold manner. First, the 
basic aim was to describe the practices of the EEAS in international negotiations. It can 
be concluded that in case of the PDCA negotiation, the EEAS promoted the 
performance of crucial practices within the context of the negotiation both domestically 
with other EU stakeholders, as well as with Cuba at the international level. The findings 
show that despite the young age of the institution, the EEAS possessed both the 
expertise as well as the authority to lead the negotiations. Its interest group 
manipulation practices were crucial in influencing preferences of core stakeholders in 
favor of the PDCA agreement. This was apparent vis-á-vis the Council since the 
constant manipulation of preferences facilitated the ratification process. The EEAS was 
also the main coordinator of the activities relating to the background work of 
Commission departments. Coordination practices were crucial in generating 
momentum with regards to stakeholders without strong vested interests in the 
negotiation. The EEAS oversaw the bargaining of the most sensitive issues as well, 
including political dialogue and human rights. It effectively used a mix of 
confrontational and cooperative strategies to achieve mutually ratifiable results. It is 
important to bear in mind that these practices pertained to the negotiation of a bilateral 
cooperation agreement with multiple issues and relatively low stakes. These criteria 
should be taken into account before implementing these findings in another case.  
Second, what conclusions may be drawn on EU international negotiations in 
general? Arguments are often made that the issuance of negotiating directives within 
the EU considerably constricts the EU’s negotiating position. This restriction stems 
from the fact that negotiating directives often represent the “lowest common 
denominator” since MSs decide upon the directives based on unanimity (Elgström and 
Strömvik 2005). In order secure all Member States’ agreement, the compromise thus 
tends to reflect the demands of the least motivated MS; otherwise it could simply veto 
the decision on the directives. However, the analysis of the PDCA agreement shows 
that the constellation of practices during negotiations renders stakeholder preferences 
more flexible than the rigidity of the directives would suggest. Understanding the 
directives as rules informing the practical intelligibility of the practice of ratification 
suggests that the dynamics of preference manipulation and formulation can influence 
the outcome of negotiations. This may also shed light on which practices promote more 
divergence from explicit formulations of the directives.  
The EU’s complex system of preferences may also serve as a catalyst for the practice 
of international negotiation. First, rigid positions signal strong commitment from the 
EU. Once the MSs and other EU stakeholders agree on the negotiating directives, they 
will most likely ratify the agreement if results are found within the overlap of win-sets. 
This makes the EU’s practice of ratification reliable and renders voluntary or 
involuntary defection virtually impossible in normal circumstances. Second, rigid 
domestic preferences constitute a tool in the hands of EU negotiators to maximize gains 
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and minimize concessions. Although the ‘take it or leave it’ approach has its risks of 
obstructing compromise-finding practices, it can effectively support distributive 
strategies. The case of the PDCA underlines these observations. Further research could 
target the causal link between reaching compromises at Level I and interest group 
manipulation at Level II.  
The third objective of the thesis was to investigate the validity of combining a 
practice approach with two-level game theory. First, two-level game theory facilitated 
the application of a practice approach. Even though practices do not necessarily 
comform the expository levels of the model, retaining these categories facilitated the 
identification and demarcation of practices. Second, construing international 
negotiation as a practice provides causal explanations on the dynamics between the 
levels of Putnam’s model. The contextuality of interrelated practices and their 
performance can shed light on how Level II practices of interest group manipulation 
and ratification influences the bargaining practice at Level I, and vice-versa.  
The combined use of practice and two-level game theories enables certain 
conclusions. First, a practice approach highlights the need to include pre-negotiations 
phase into the two-level game structure. Construing it as a practice enables the 
understanding of practical intelligibility and contexts behind the practices of 
international negotiations. Second, practice analysis underlined the importance of 
intersubjectivity behind bargaining strategies. Overall, more confrontational bargaining 
tactics were utilized in areas of high political salience, whereas more technical areas 
with low political salience, such as certain cooperation development articles, were more 
cooperative. Based on the findings, I argue that the utilization of practice theory 
promises valuable cross-avenues for the interpretation of the two-level game model. 
The analysis of the PDCA negotiations highlights a possible research avenue for 
future practice-theoretical studies. The practices of the EEAS vis-á-vis the Commission 
showed confusion regarding the assignment of tasks. One of the main tenets of practice 
theory is that practices are guided by practical intelligibility based on intersubjectivity 
and shared understandings. The findings would suggest that this was not always the 
case during the practice of interinstitutional coordination. It could be argued that the 
coordination practice was suboptimal because practitioners did not share the same 
understanding on how they made sense to perform. A question thus arises: how can be 
the core concepts of practice operationalized to measure the effectiveness of practices?  
One argument could be that the more impaired certain concepts of practices are, the 
more likely they would become less effective. However, this question necessitates 
further research.  
Finally, a few thoughts on methodology and equifinality. The application of practice 
theory poses serious impediments in the study of the closed circles of diplomacy and 
negotiations. The basic tenets of practice theory dictate that practices should be 
observed, studied, and even performed. A thorough ‘by-the-book’ methodology is 
almost impossible to fully carry out, an outside researcher simply does not possess the 
necessary resources and security clearances to attend international negotiation sessions. 
Interviews, therefore, provide the next best alternative. However, a practice approach 
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requires a well-constructed interview script to reconstruct larger phenomena from daily 
activities. Ironically, many interviewees will be baffled facing a question like “what do 
you do on a daily basis”. One should not be surprised to get a reply along the lines of 
“I write emails, make phone calls, attend meetings, and I also write reports”. My 
conclusion is that in practice-based research, considerable rapport-building is required 
during interviews to have comfortable discussions on how practices are performed. In 
my opinion, however, this means that phone-based interviews are less than satisfactory. 
The personal presence and intercultural connection are crucial to understand the 
interviewee’s point of view and, perhaps more importantly, to have the interviewee 
understand the practice researcher’s rationale behind some of the more odd-sounding 
questions.  
Because of the methodological impediments, elimination of equifinality may also 
be challenging. In other words, if a practice research is not sustained by the prerequisite 
methods, can we argue that the same results would not have been attainable by other 
means? In the case of this thesis, I am not convinced that similar results could not have 
been achieved based on a different approach. The lack of accessible methods simply 
did not allow full immersion in practices. However, I do argue that the conclusions 
demonstrate the validity of a practice approach in two-level game research and 
highlight unique results. For example, the causal links between trust building and 
bargaining practices at Level I would not have been identified without the consideration 
of the core practice concepts. In conclusion, I believe that my findings may encourage 
further research in this area and transferring results to other cases.  
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Appendix 
 
Interview Script 
 
EU-Cuba relations and PDCA negotiations 
Interview with EEAS official 
November 15, 2017 
 
1. INITIAL INFORMATION 
a. Research background, objective 
b. Practice theory – daily practices 
c. EEAS negotiations and Cuba under-researched 
d. Confidentiality and anonymous 
2. What is your role as a desk officer for Cuba and as a principal 
administrator? 
a. Where are you based? (Brussels? In MD-Americas under E. Hrda?) 
b. Which EU institutions/departments are you in contact most frequently? 
c. How many colleagues do you have at the Latin-America Dpt.?  
d. What is your relationship with Cuban officials? 
3. Could you briefly describe EU-Cuba relations?  
a. The role of US 
b. How important is EU-Cuba relations for the EEAS and other EU 
institutions? 
c. How politicized is this issue? 
4. In the framework of the PDCA matter, what were your general and daily 
tasks (especially leading up to the EP ratification)?  
a. How frequently are you in contact with Cuban counterparts? 
b. How closely did you work with Commission? (especially DGs DEVCO, 
TRADE, HOME) 
c. What about Member States? Only through Council, or directly as well? 
d. What about third party lobby groups, interested outside groups? (e.g. 
Ladies in White)  
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5. Since February 2017, which EU institution was the most heavily involved 
in the interinstitutional processes regarding the EU-Cuba agreement? 
(optional depending on questions above - leave it if necessary) 
6. Can you walk me through the process leading up to the EP ratification?  
a. How difficult was the ratification process at the EU Parliament? 
7. What is the general opinion within the EU institutions on the PDCA? 
a. What is your view on the human rights concerns? What do your 
colleagues think about it? 
8. What do you expect at Member State level ratification processes? 
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Academic interview Script 
 
EU-Cuba relations and PDCA negotiations 
Interview with EEAS official 
December 5, 2017 
 
9. What was your role during the EU-Cuba PDCA negotiations? 
a. General and daily tasks 
10. Could you please describe the negotiation process for me? 
a. 7 rounds of negotiations 
b. work done in between rounds 
c. EU interests 
d. Cuban interests 
11. How would you characterize the negotiations with the Cuban negotiating 
party?  
a. Which were the most difficult rounds/topics and how did you resolve 
them? 
b. Which were the easiest rounds/topics and why? 
c. Human rights issues? 
12. Please describe the internal (EU level) bargaining process underlying the 
negotiation process. 
a. Core stakeholders and interests 
b. Which institution/department had the strongest (i.e. most difficult to 
influence) position on PDCA and why? 
c. The role of EEAS in bringing the interests closer 
13. What is the general opinion within the EU institutions on the PDCA? 
a. What is your view on the human rights concerns? What do your 
colleagues think about it? 
14. What do you expect at Member State level ratification processes? 
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Academic interview Script 
 
EU-Cuba relations and PDCA negotiations 
Interview with European Commission official 
December 7, 2017 
 
1. What was your role during the EU-Cuba PDCA negotiations? 
a. General and daily tasks 
b. What other tasks, projects did you have?  
c. How many colleagues worked on the PDCA negotiations?  
d. Article formulation?  
2. Could you please describe the negotiation process for me? 
a. 7 rounds of negotiations 
b. work done in between rounds 
c. European Commission and DG Trade interests 
d. EEAS interests – any conflict? 
e. Cuban interests 
3. How would you characterize the negotiations with the Cuban negotiating 
party?  
a. Which were the most difficult rounds/topics and how did you resolve 
them? 
b. Which were the easiest rounds/topics and why? 
4. Please describe the internal (EU level) bargaining process underlying the 
negotiation process. 
a. Core stakeholders and interests 
b. Platform to discuss this issue? 
c. Role of DG Trade and the EEAS 
d. Which institution/department had the strongest position on PDCA and 
why? 
e. How were the stakeholder interests harmonized within the EU? 
f. Member State influence 
5. What will be your tasks regarding the implementation of the PDCA 
agreement? 
6. What is the general opinion within the EU institutions on the PDCA? 
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7. What do you expect at Member State level ratification processes? 
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Academic interview Script 
 
EU-Cuba relations and PDCA negotiations 
Interview with European Commission official 
December 8, 2017 
 
1. What was your role during the EU-Cuba PDCA negotiations? 
a. General and daily tasks 
2. Could you please describe the negotiation process for me? 
a. 7 rounds of negotiations 
b. Work done in between rounds 
c. European Commission and DG DEVCO interests 
d. Cuban interests 
3. How would you characterize the negotiations with the Cuban negotiating 
party?  
a. Which were the most difficult rounds/topics and how did you resolve 
them? 
b. Which were the easiest rounds/topics and why? 
4. Please describe the internal (EU level) bargaining process underlying the 
negotiation process. 
a. Core stakeholders and interests 
b. Role of DG DEVCO and the EEAS 
c. Which institution/department had the strongest position on PDCA and 
why? 
d. How were the stakeholder interests harmonized within the EU? 
e. Member State influence 
5. In terms of the workload, how involved will be your DG with PDCA? 
6. What is the general opinion within the EU institutions on the PDCA? 
7. What do you expect at Member State level ratification processes? 
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Interview questions 
Follow-up email correspondence with EEAS official 
December 19, 2017 
 
1. Is it customary for the HR/VP to sign cooperation agreements with third parties? 
(it is the President who appoints the signatory on behalf of the EU) 
2. Am I correct to understand that the COLAC was the primary official forum 
where the negotiating directives were negotiated between the MSs and the 
EEAS? Did it ever make it to COREPER level in issues where the working 
party could not decide on? 
3. According to the EU Council’s decision authorizing the Commission to open 
negotiations, the negotiations had to be conducted in “close consultation” with 
the COLAC. You mentioned that there were COLAC meetings once before and 
after every rounds as well as additional visits by the HR/VP. Did the process of 
finding the necessary compromises between the MSs and Cuba ever involve 
consultations at the COREPER level or require the ‘intervention’ of the HR/VP?  
 
